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Need to know  
 
x The Scottish economy continues to remain in a precarious position. Output declined in the 
final three months of 2016, and most business surveys and indicators of economic confidence 
suggest any growth in the first six months of 2017 has been fragile at best.  
 
x Whether or not Scotland has formally entered technical recession (defined as two consecutive 
quarters of falling output) is in the balance.  
 
x All things considered, we still expect the Scottish economy to grow this year and create more 
jobs ± albeit at rates well below trend. A number RIµELJ¶SROLWLFDOfactors ± not least the Brexit 
negotiations ± cast a shadow over the outlook. 
 
x In such uncertain times, we continue to recommend that just as much attention is given to the 
range of estimates that underpin this outlook as well as our central estimates.  
 
x Our central forecast is for growth of 1.2% in 2017, 1.4% in 2018 and 1.6% in 2019 ± broadly 
in line with our March forecast.   
 
x Financial and business surveys are forecast to lead the return to growth, building on the 
momentum gained over the last year to eighteen months. Food & drink and tourism should 
continue to benefit from the low value of Sterling, although the retail sector will face further 
pressure as a result of falling household incomes.  
 
x Unemployment is forecast to rise slightly as the recent sharp increase in inactivity levels off.  
 
FAI forecast Scottish GVA growth (%) by sector, 2017 to 2019 
 2017 2018 2019 
GVA 1.2 1.4 1.6 
Production 1.4 1.6 1.8 
Construction 0.7 0.8 1.0 
Services 1.2 1.3 1.6 
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute 
 
 
 
FAI labour market forecast to 2019 
 2017 2018 2019 
Employee Jobs 2,436,450 2,476,450 2,514,700 
Unemployment 117,000 134,300 143,750 
Rate (%) 4.4 5.0 5.3 
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute 
 
 
 
 
 
GVA forecast range 2017 to 2019 
 
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute 
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Summary 
The economic news since our March Commentary 
has continued to paint a relatively disappointing 
picture of the performance of the Scottish economy.  
6FRWODQG¶VHFRQRP\shrank in the final three 
months of 2016, with the slowdown evident across 
most key sectors.  
The latest indicators of consumer confidence and 
business activity suggest that growth has returned 
during the first half of 2017 but remains fragile.  
Such weakness can no longer be explained solely 
by the downturn in the oil and gas industry. Nor, 
given the relative resilience of the UK economy, 
can it be the result of Brexit (yet).  
Instead it would appear that the economy is stuck 
in a cycle of low growth, weak investment and 
fragile confidence.  
The one bright spot has been the labour market 
which continues to hold up remarkably well with 
unemployment at a record low and employment 
growing.  
However, over the past two years there has been a 
movement from unemployment into inactivity, whilst 
the recent growth in employment has been largely 
in self-employment ± some of which is likely to be 
relatively insecure.  
At the same time, productivity growth remains poor 
not just by international standards but also by 
6FRWODQG¶V own recent trends. This lack of 
improvement in productivity is feeding into 
weakened pay growth, putting further downward 
pressure on household incomes.   
With the effects of any Brexit headwinds and rising 
inflation likely to become more significant in the 
coming months, the resilience of the Scottish 
economy is likely to be severely tested.  
Whether or not Scotland formally enters recession 
when the next set of data are released is in the 
balance. We believe that the Scottish economy will 
still grow over the year as a whole (and more 
quickly than last year) but further negative quarters 
of growth are highly possible.  
In such challenging economic times, it is vital that 
businesses focus on the long-term drivers of 
growth including: accessing new external markets, 
grasping the opportunities from the rapid 
expansion in new technology and improving firm 
specific efficiency and productivity levels.  
It is also right that businesses demand much more 
of a policy effort from government.  Recent 
debates have understandably focussed on the 
general election, the constitution and Brexit.  
However, what our economy needs ± more than 
ever ± is clear policy strategies backed-up by 
concrete action.  
The Scottish economy has been flat lining for two 
years. The EU referendum result was known 12 
months ago.  
But what genuinely new policy actions ± with 
immediate effects ± have been taken in response? 
And what has been their impact? 
To what extent have both the Scottish and UK 
*RYHUQPHQW¶VFKDQJHGWKHLUHFRQRPLFVWUDWHJLHV
to cope with a world where we will no longer be 
part of the EU?  
With Brexit undoubtedly adding new risks and new 
RSSRUWXQLWLHVµSROLF\DVXVXDO¶LVQRORQJHUDQ
option.  
A renewed focus on how both the Scottish and UK 
Governments can use the powers at their disposal 
to support the Scottish economy is urgently 
needed.  
 
 
Fraser of Allander Institute 
June 2017 
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Outlook and Appraisal 
 
Scotland is on the brink of recession with most indicators suggesting economic activity 
during 2017 has been modest at best. Whether or not the data confirms DµWHFKQLFDO¶
recession when published next month is in itself ± in our view ± not especially 
important. Of greater concern is the lack of growth over the past two years and that 
what started as a downturn in oil and gas has become more widespread.  All things 
considered, we still expect growth to pick-up this year but to remain well below trend.  
Table 1: Scottish growth (%) by sector, Q4 2016 
 GDP Agriculture Production Construction Services 
Q4 -0.2 -0.2 -0.9 -0.8 +0.0 
UK  
 
+0.7 +1.0 +0.4 +1.0 +0.8 
Annual +0.0 +0.3 -4.6 -6.0 +1.6 
UK +1.9 +1.9 +1.9 +2.8 +2.9 
Source: Scottish Government, Q4 GDP 
 
 
 
Chart 1: Scottish & UK cumulative growth ± since 2015 
 
Source: Scottish Government, Q4 GDP 
 
 
 
Table 2: Labour market, Feb-Apr 2017 
 Employment 
(16-64) 
Unemployment 
(16+) 
Inactivity 
(16-64) 
Scotland 74.1 4.0 22.7 
England 75.2 4.6 21.1 
Wales 72.9 4.8 23.2 
N. Ire 68.8 5.4 27.2 
UK 74.8 4.6 21.5 
Source: ONS, Labour Force Survey
 
Introduction 
The Scottish economy contracted in the final 
quarter of 2016. The poor figures were 
comprehensive. Production and construction 
output fell, whilst services remained flat. 
During 2016, the Scottish economy did not grow at 
all, compared to growth of 1.9% in the UK. 
This divergence is not new. Growth in Scotland 
has lagged the UK for 2 years (Chart 1). 
,QFRQWUDVW6FRWODQG¶VODERXUPDUNHWFRQWLQXHVWR
hold up remarkably well (Table 2). Unemployment 
is at record lows. But we continue to urge caution 
against viewing these figures in isolation, 
particularly given recent increases in inactivity and 
less secure self-employment.    
Businesses in Scotland are likely to face a tough 
trading environment for the foreseeable future. 
Weak domestic demand in Scotland, a cooling UK 
economy, inflation and ongoing political 
uncertainty, does not lend itself to a positive 
backdrop for growth.   
In such times, seeking new opportunities in 
overseas markets alongside a relentless focus on 
the long-run drivers firms can control ± such as 
efficiency improvements, strategic investments, 
staff training etc. ± will be crucial.   
From a policy perspective, there is an urgent need 
IRUDFWLRQWRVXSSRUW6FRWODQG¶VHFRQRP\Debates 
over Brexit and the constitution cannot be used as 
an excuse not to make full use of the levers that 
the Scottish and UK Governments do control. 
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Table 3: An improving global outlook ± World growth 
forecasts (% change on a year earlier) 
 2016 2017 2018 
World Output 3.1 3.5 3.6 
G7 1.7 2.0 2.0 
US 1.6 2.3 2.5 
Euro Area 1.7 1.7 1.6 
Emerging & Developing 4.1 4.5 4.8 
China 6.7 6.6 6.2 
World Trade 2.2 3.8 3.9 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook 
 
 
 
Chart 2: Global stock markets at near record levels (Jan 
16=100) 
 
Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream 
 
 
 
Chart 3: OECD composite leading indicator ± above 100 = 
conditions above long-term trend (and vice versa) 
  
 
Source: OECD, Leading indicators and tendency surveys
 
 
 
The global economy 
The fundamentals of the global economy are 
stronger than they have been for many years.  
World economic activity is picking up with a long 
awaited recovery in investment and trade. 
The IMF forecast global growth to rise from around 
3% in 2016 to nearer 3.5% this year and next ± not 
too far away from long-term average growth rates.  
Encouragingly, growth in international trade is 
expected to move ahead ± once again ± of growth 
in the global economy. Faster trade growth is 
generally seen as a good indicator of robust 
activity.  
Financial markets have also held on to gains made 
in early 2017 and levels of business and consumer 
confidence are, on the whole, positive (Chart 2). 
The keenly watched µ2(&'/eading Indicator¶ 
points to the major advanced economies 
continuing to grow close to their long-term average 
in the near term (Chart 3).  
,QWHUPVRI6FRWODQG¶VWZRPDLQLQWHUQDWLRQDO
export markets, the outlook is more positive than in 
recent years.  
Firstly, whilst the US economy has posted 
relatively modest results so far this year, strong job 
market data and an anticipated fiscal stimulus 
should lead to faster growth this year and next. 
Secondly, the recovery in Europe continues to 
build and has now reached all Euro Area 
countries. But whilst unemployment continues its 
downward trend, it remains high with painful 
structural adjustments still needed. Even by 2018, 
Euro Area unemployment is still projected to be 
close to 8%.   
The greatest risk to the global economy remains 
policy uncertainty, from President Trump through 
to Brexit. And there are also a number of 
imbalances and vulnerabilities in financial markets 
± not least in China ± which pose their own risks to 
the global outlook.  
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 Chart 4: Scottish exports by sector 2015 
 
Source: Scottish Government, Export Statistics Scotland 
 
 
 
Table 4: International exports by size of company: 2014-15 
(£ million) 
  2014 2015 change 
Scottish International 
Exports  27,740 28,740 +3..6% 
Large 14,910 15,585 +4.5% 
Medium 7,515 8,350 +11.2% 
Small 5,315 4,805 -9.6% 
Source: Scottish Government, Export Statistics Scotland 
 
 
 
Table 5: :RUOG¶VWRSHFRQRPLHV, 2016 and 2050 (GDP 
at PPPs): highlighted denotes E7 country 
 2016 2050  
China 1 1 China 
US 2 2 India 
India 3 3 US 
Japan 4 4 Indonesia 
Germany 5 5 Brazil 
Russia 6 6 Russia 
Brazil 7 7 Mexico 
Indonesia 8 8 Japan 
UK 9 9 Germany 
France 10 10 UK 
Source: IMF & PWC µ7KH:RUOGLQ¶
 
 
 
 
 
On balance however, the global outlook should 
provide a positive source of demand for Scottish 
businesses over the near term.  
Disappointingly, we have yet to see much 
evidence of this spilling over into Scottish exports 
and overall, our trade performance remains poor.  
IIZHDUHWRVHHDIXQGDPHQWDOVKLIWLQ6FRWODQG¶V
long-term economic prosperity we need to improve 
both the depth and breadth of our export base.  
Just five sectors account for over half of all 
Scottish international exports, with whisky 
accounting for a significant chunk of that ± Chart 4.  
Just 100 companies are believed to account for 
around 60% of total Scottish international exports.  
A particular challenge appears to be encouraging 
small businesses to seize opportunities overseas.  
The most recent Small Business Survey Scotland 
figures show that just 12% of Scottish SMEs are 
exporters, compared to 19% in the UK as a whole.  
Worryingly, the latest statistics reported a near 
10% fall in exports from small companies in 
Scotland ± Table 4.  
If Brexit forces policymakers and businesses to do 
anything, then it might be to put greater effort into 
seeking new opportunities in global markets.   
And there is much to be gained.  
Analysis by PWC (Table 5) ± based upon current 
growth and population trends ± highlights the 
changing global economic order over the coming 
decades. By 2050, 6 of the 7 largest economies in 
the world will be from outside the G7. If Turkey is 
added to complete the list of E7 countries, their 
combined output will be double that of the G7.   
'HVSLWHWKHLUHFRQRPLFSRWHQWLDO6FRWODQG¶VH[SRUW
UHFRUGWR(FRXQWULHVUHPDLQVSRRU6FRWODQG¶V
trade with Ireland is 60% more than with China 
and its trade with India is the same as with 
Luxembourg. So clearly there is potential but much 
still needs to be done.  
Fraser of Allander Institute Economic Commentary, June 2017  
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Chart 5: The UK has performed well in comparison to other 
G7 economies in recent years 
Source: ONS, National Accounts & OECD, Economic Outlook 
 
 
 
Chart 6: UK average weekly earnings:  3-month average 
on same time a year ago  
Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream, ONS 
 
 
 
Chart 7: Strong growth in consumption beginning to ease  
 
Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream, ONS 
 
 
 
The UK Economy 
The health of the UK economy has an important 
bearing on 6FRWODQG¶Veconomic outlook. Around 
£11.5bn of Scottish exports are sold to rUK each 
quarter ± supporting around 530,000 jobs.  
The UK grew relatively strongly through 2016, 
apparently confounding predictions of a post-EU 
referendum hangover.  
And at first glance, many of the 8.¶V 
macroeconomic fundamentals are in relatively 
good health. For example, employment levels 
continue to reach new highs. 
Indeed since 2014, the UK has been one of the 
strongest performing G7 economies ± albeit on the 
back of the slowest recovery since the 1920s 
(Chart 5). But as we have outlined before, 
underneath the headline figures there have been 
concerns about the sustainability of this growth.  
In particular, recent UK growth has been almost 
entirely reliant on rising household consumption 
driven by increased borrowing and reduced 
savings (rather than rising incomes).  
With inflation rising and earnings growth still weak 
± Chart 6 ± it is no surprise that the growth in 
consumption has started to ease off. During Q1 
2017, consumption grew by just 0.3% ± its 
weakest rate since late 2014 (Chart 7).  
Growth in other elements of the economy remains 
fragile at best. Business investment has for 
example, continued to flat-line since the EU 
referendum (Chart 8). 
And the hoped for ERXQFHLQWKH8.¶VWUDGH
position in the light of a more competitive pound 
appears to be sporadic at best. Whilst elements of 
PDQXIDFWXULQJKDYHGRQHZHOORYHUDOOWKH8.¶V
balance of trade position remains poor (Chart 9).  
At least in the short-run, the process of leaving the 
EU does not offer much hope that trade or 
investment will be able to pick up all of the shortfall 
as consumption returns to more sustainable levels.  
Fraser of Allander Institute Economic Commentary, June 2017  
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Chart 8: Weak business investment will continue to act as 
a drag on long-term economic growth 
 
Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream, ONS
 
 
 
Chart 9: UK Net trade balance remains dire 
 
Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream, ONS 
 
 
 
Chart 10: UK growth slowing in Q1 2017 
 
Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream, ONS 
 
 
With the UK Government still keen on restoring the 
public finances to a degree of health, it is easy to 
see why there has been a cooling in the UK 
economy ± with growth falling from 0.7% in Q4 
2016, to 0.2% in Q1 2017 (Chart 10).  
 
The UK Economic Outlook  
Looking forward, there remains a fair degree of 
uncertainty over the immediate outlook for the UK 
economy.  
None of this is helped by ongoing policy 
uncertainty.  
The recent General Election has only served to 
add to the lack of clarity with regard to the long-
term policy objectives of the UK Government.  
It would appear however ± and admittedly this 
remains a fluid situation ± the prospects of a hard 
Brexit may have receded somewhat in the past 
few weeks. But there clearly remains much 
uncertainty about what any final deal may look like 
and the market access that the UK will have to its 
largest trading partner.  
The Chancellor has also signalled an openness to 
ease back on levels of austerity to help support the 
economy in the near term but it will be the new 
Autumn Budget before we find out what this will 
mean in practice. 
Most forecasters predict that the UK economy will 
slowdown in 2017, but will be much more healthy 
than initially thought immediately following the EU 
referendum ± Chart 11.  
This position is supported by most measures of 
business activity which continue to indicate 
relatively health trading conditions in both services 
and manufacturing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fraser of Allander Institute Economic Commentary, June 2017  
9 
 
Chart 11: Evolution of UK forecasts for 2017 
 
Source: HM Treasury 
 
 
 
Chart 12: PMI for UK remains positive ± although services 
have started to report a less confident outlook  
Source: IHS Markit 
 
 
 
Chart 13: Inflation rising (and likely to exceed 3% in the 
next few months) 
 
Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream, ONS 
 
 
The keenly watched IHS Markit PMI index, 
remains above its cut-off value of 50, which marks 
the boundary between expansion and contraction. 
The manufacturing sector appears to be 
particularly strong (Chart 12).  
Levels of business confidence have fallen back a 
little. The CBI Business Optimism index fell back 
significantly during Q2 2017 whilst the ZEW 
Economic Sentiment Index is not too far away from 
the lows reported at the height of the financial 
crisis in 2008.  
+RZHYHURQHWKLQJODVW\HDU¶VUHDFWLRQWRWKH(8
referendum taught us was to avoid reading too 
much into short-term swings in economic 
sentiment as these are often not reflected in the 
actual decisions businesses take. But if such 
trends were to persist then it would clearly become 
more of a concern.  
Overall, the underlying picture has not changed 
significantly since the 2%5¶VHFRQRPLFDQGILVFDO
outlook in March 2017.  
Looking ahead, there is likely to be less support 
from domestic demand, as further falls in real 
earnings ± and an easing in the draw-down of 
savings and growth in borrowing ± impact on 
household spending.  
A key determinant of the future outlook will be 
what happens to inflation. The Bank of England 
now expects inflation to be even higher this year 
than they initially thought (Chart 13).  
$WLQ$SULOLQIODWLRQLVZHOODERYHWKH%DQN¶V
target of 2%. Higher inflation not only erodes real 
earnings but as it is largely being driven by rising 
producer prices from more expensive imports, and 
this imposes a cost on businesses.  
7KH%DQNRI(QJODQG¶V03&DSSHDUVWREH
increasingly split on the prospects of a rise in 
interest rates to dampen inflationary pressures. If 
they do raise rates, this will be the first increase 
since before the financial crisis.  
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Chart 14: Scottish vs. UK economic performance  
 
 Source: Scottish Government, Q4 GDP 
 
 
 
Chart 15: Weakness across sectors evident over the year 
in the Scottish economy 
 
 Source: Scottish Government, Q4 GDP 
 
 
 
Chart 16: Business activity in the north east ± as a result of 
downturn in oil and gas ± lagging behind Scotland 
 
 Source: RBS/FAI Scottish Business Monitor 
 
 
Recent Scottish Economy Data 
The Scottish economy contracted in the final 3-
months of 2016. As Chart 14 highlights, there is 
little doubt that the recent data is part of a 
sustained trend.  
Of particular concern is the weakness across the 
economy (Chart 15). In the final 3 months of 2016, 
both production and construction output fell, whilst 
the all-important services sector remained flat. 
We have now seen two years of low (or in some 
4¶VQRJURZWKIndeed, between Q4 2015 and Q4 
2016, the Scottish economy did not grow at all, 
compared to growth of 1.9% in the UK. 
As an aside, the Scottish Government now 
references the 4Q-on-4Q measure which shows 
an expansion of 0.4% over the year. The 4Q-on-
4Q measure is the sum of the entire 4 quarters this 
year compared to last. In a period of weakening 
growth, this approach will initially give a more 
positive assessment than simply comparing the 
output at the same point from one year to the next.  
Whatever cut of data is used, what is clear is that 
the Scottish economy is barely growing (if at all).  
So much so that the Scottish economy now 
VDWLVILHVWKHFULWHULDIRUµHPHUJHQF\ERUURZLQJ¶that 
was built in to the new Fiscal Framework to unlock 
temporary funds during an asymmetric shock.   
The conditions for this funding (via borrowing from 
HM Treasury) were ±³VKRXOGWKH6FRWWLVKHFRQRP\
grow 1 percentage point more slowly than the UK 
DVDZKROHDQGKDYHJURZWKRIOHVVWKDQ´.  
So what explains this lack of growth? 
A key driver has undoubtedly been the downturn in 
the North Sea. Whilst North Sea output does not 
actually enter the Scottish figures (which only 
cover the onshore economy), the supply chain that 
supports the oil and gas industry does. 
As a result, measures of economic activity in the 
North East have unsurprisingly been much weaker 
than for the economy as a whole (Chart 16). 
Fraser of Allander Institute Economic Commentary, June 2017  
11 
 
Table 6: Downturn in manufacturing ± not just oil and gas 
  
Change over 
last 12 
months 
Change over 
last 24 
months 
Total Manufacturing -7.3% -10.4% 
Food & Drink -6.6% -2.1% 
Textiles -11.6% -10.2% 
Refined petroleum & 
chemicals -8.3% -2.1% 
Metals & metal products -6.3% -25.0% 
Computer & electrical 
products -5.9% -13.3% 
Transport equipment -8.8% -8.2% 
Other manufacturing ± 
including repair & 
installation 
-6.7% -11.4% 
Source: Scottish Government, Q4 GDP 
 
  
 
Chart 17: Scotland vs. the rest of the UK: PMI 
 
 Source: Markit IHS 
 
 
 
Chart 18: Drivers of nominal GDP: households remain key  
 
Source: Scottish Government, Q4 National Accounts
 
But there is increasing evidence that the North Sea 
is only part of the explanation of the difference in 
economic fortunes between Scotland and the UK. 
For example, whilst engineering firms and oil 
support services have been hit, every single one of 
6FRWODQG¶VSULQFLSDOPDQXIDFWXULQJVHFWRUV
contracted during 2016 (Table 6).  
Some have suggested that Brexit may be a factor. 
But it is hard to argue that this explains the 
Scot/UK divergence.  Moreover, services ± around 
75% of the economy and less likely to be exposed 
to external conditions ± grew nearly twice as fast in 
the UK as in Scotland last year.  
Others have argued that the prospects for a 2nd 
independence referendum may be having an 
impact, although there is little robust data to 
formally test this hypothesis (and indicators of 
international investment remain positive).   
Taken together though, it is possible to argue that 
such effects may have had a greater cumulative 
effect on Scotland, especially to confidence.   
The Scottish Government has argued that the UK 
results might be impacted by the strength of 
London.   
Whilst up-to-date indicators of performance within 
the UK are few and far between, those that do 
exist ± such as the PMI ± tend to suggest that 
Scotland has been lagging behind other parts of 
the UK and not just London (see Chart 17).  
And whether you accept this argument or not, it is 
important to remember that the Scottish 
Government signed up to a new fiscal framework 
where what matters is 6FRWODQG¶VUHODWLYH
performance vs.the rUK as a whole (including 
London).  
Drivers of growth 
Similar to in the UK, household spending has 
continued to make the main positive contribution to 
Scottish growth in recent times. Indeed, it was by 
far the greatest source of nominal growth in Q4 
2016 (Chart 18).  
-3%
-3%
-2%
-2%
-1%
-1%
0%
1%
1%
2%
2%
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
2014 2015 2016
Co
nt
rib
ut
io
n 
to
 
no
m
in
a
l G
DP
Households
General Government
GFCF
Net Trade
Nominal GVA growth
Fraser of Allander Institute Economic Commentary, June 2017  
12 
 
Chart 19: Ongoing challenges with Scottish exports ± 
falling manufactured exports for 8 quarters 
 
 
Source: Scottish Government, Q4 National Accounts 
 
 
 
Chart 20: Fall in business investment over the year 
 
Source: Scottish Government, Q4 National Accounts([S¶'DWD
 
 
 
Chart 21: Compensation of employees weaker in Scotland 
± less growth in employment and slower growth in wages 
 
Source: Scottish Government, Q4 National Accounts 
 
 
In contrast, ScotlanG¶VWUDGHEDODQFHUHPDLQV
weak, with the net trade position once again 
contributing negatively to overall growth. On this 
occasion, the weakness appears to be a fall-back 
in exports to the rest of the UK.  
But international trade also remains generally 
weak (Chart 19).  
6FRWODQG¶VLQWHUQDWLRQDOPanufactured exports are, 
for example, down 7% on the year. Engineering 
exports ± around 1/3 of the total ± have fallen by 
nearly 20% since the start of 2015.   
The same National Accounts data reveals that one 
of the reasons for the slowdown in Scotland is 
because firms have cut back on investment.  
Business investment not only has an important 
immediate impact on the economy through 
supporting demand, but also through its long-term 
impact on the efficiency and productivity of firms 
(and the overall economy).   
As highlighted above, business investment has 
been weak across the UK. But it still did manage to 
increase in cash terms over the year (up by 0.1%). 
In contrast, business investment fell in Scotland 
over the past year ± Chart 20. 
Taken all together, it is clear that the little growth 
we have had in Scotland has been relatively 
unbalanced.  
Growth remains largely concentrated in household 
spending, as Chart 18 highlights, but the income 
going to employees has been growing much more 
weakly in Scotland than in the rest of the UK 
(Chart 21).  
This is likely to be a combination of both weaker 
employment growth in Scotland and lower 
earnings. 
The reason that households have been able to 
support growing consumption has therefore been 
because they have been running down their 
savings (and increasing their borrowings).  
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Chart 22: Net savings ratio and value of personal loans 
 
Source: Scottish Government, Q4 National Accounts and BBA 
 
 
 
Chart 23: Retail & wholesale ± Scotland vs. UK  
 
 Source: Scottish Government, Q4 GDP & ONS 
 
 
 
Chart 24: Construction output (nominal): New Work 
 
Source: ONS, Output in the construction industry
 
 
 
 
 
As a result, 6FRWODQG¶VHVWLPDWHGVDYLQJUDWLRis 
now at a record low (whilst personal loans are 
rising) (Chart 22).  
With a highly uncertain outlook for the economy, 
the ability of households to keep using reduced 
savings and higher levels of indebtedness as a 
buffer to protect spending is a key risk to growth.  
Sectoral performance 
Growth across the Scottish economy has been 
relatively weak across the board.   
One area of concern appears to be retail and 
wholesale which, as we discuss later, is likely to be 
linked to a low level of consumer confidence 
(Chart 23).  
Construction has continued to act as a drag on 
growth ± with the sector down 6% over the year. 
Recent data for 2017 suggests little turnaround 
just yet ± with total construction work 2% lower in 
cash terms in Q1 2017 compared to a year ago 
(Chart 24).  
As highlighted above, manufacturing has slowed 
down significantly (Table 6).  
One bright spot has been financial services. Whilst 
output slipped back a little in Q4 2016, growth over 
the past two years has been encouraging. The 
sector is still 6% off its pre-financial crisis peak and 
jobs remain down, but given the challenges faced 
in recent years this is a welcome return to growth.  
 
Chart 25: Financial Services in Scotland 
Source: Scottish Government, Q4 GDP, ONS
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Chart 26: Scottish employment & unemployment rate 
 
 Source: ONS, Labour Force Survey 
 
 
 
Chart 27: Scottish & UK inactivity rates since 2008 
 
 Source: ONS, Labour Force Survey and FAI calculations 
 
 
 
Chart 28: Scottish & UK underemployment (hours) since 
2008 
 
 Source: ONS, LFS Supplementary Data 
 
 
 
 
 
The Scottish labour market 
Despite apparently very little growth in the overall 
HFRQRP\ 6FRWODQG¶V ODERXU PDUNHW FRQWLQXHV WR
hold up remarkably well.   
The 16+ unemployment rate has fallen to 4% (or 
4.1% for 16-64 year olds), the lowest since May 
2008, and jointly the lowest since 1992.  
These improvements continue the trend since 2012 
of a strengthening labour market (Chart 26).   
For most of the past decade, Scotland had a better 
employment and unemployment rate than the UK 
DV D ZKROH 1RZ 6FRWODQG¶V HPSOR\PHQW UDWH is 
0.7% points lower than the UK rate. Against that, 
6FRWODQG¶VXQHPSOR\PHQWUDWHLVVOLJKWO\better by a 
similar margin.   
This apparently odd result ± stronger on 
unemployment but weaker on employment ± is 
H[SODLQHG E\ 6FRWODQG¶V KLJKHU LQDFWLYLW\ UDWH (i.e. 
those not in work nor seeking work).  
As Chart 27 highlights, Scotland had been tracking 
the fall in inactivity rates witnessed across the UK 
up to 2016.  
However, since then, inactivity rates have increased 
in Scotland. Whilst this rise has stabilised in recent 
months, ScoWODQG¶VLQDFWLYLW\UDWHLVQRZRYHUDfull 
percentage point higher than that of the UK.  
Levels of underemployment ± that is people in work 
but who would prefer to work longer hours ± have 
fallen back towards pre-recession levels (Chart 28).  
And 6FRWODQG¶V\RXWKXQHPSOR\PHQWUDWH
continues to outperform all other parts of the UK 
and compares favourably internationally. 
However, as we highlighted in our most recent 
Scottish Labour Market Trends report, the headline 
figures do hide some challenges.  
Firstly, the type of employment being created 
appears to be less secure in many instances.  
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Chart 29: Sharp rise in self-employment 
 
Source: ONS, Labour Force Survey 
 
 
 
Chart 30: Weekly hours of work of the self-employed 
 
Source: ONS, Labour Force Survey 
 
 
 
Chart 31: 6FRWODQG¶VSURGXFWLYLW\JURZWKVLQFH 
 
Source: Scottish Government & FAI calculations 
 
 
 
Since the financial crisis there has been a rise in 
part-time employment (up around 8% over the past 
decade). Within this, there has been a 45% 
increase in the number of people who say the 
reason they are working part-time is that they 
cannot find a full-time job.  
Self-employment has also risen ± up around 29%. 
This trend appears to be continuing. Indeed, nearly 
all of the Scottish employment growth over the 
past year was in the form of self-employment ± 
and concentrated amongst men.  
Sometimes when thinking about self-employment 
people have in mind someone starting businesses 
and creating jobs. However, partly as a result of 
technological innovation, the self-employed are 
now a much more diverse group.  
A concern that exists about this increase is that 
whilst, for some, the greater flexibility that self-
employment brings is welcome, for others, it may 
come with less stable and rewarding opportunities 
and fewer employment protections.  
More work needs to be done to understand the 
characteristics of this surge in self-employment 
(e.g. by skill level and age), and to understand the 
types of work being entered into. 
One consequence of rising employment in an 
environment of weak economic growth is that the 
amount produced per worker will be stagnant or 
falling.  
Productivity in Scotland ± as measured by output 
per hour worked ± fell 1.5% during 2016. This was 
on the back of strong growth in 2015 (of 3.4%).   
Scottish and UK productivity has been weak since 
the financial crisis. Between 1998 and the end of 
2006, productivity in Scotland grew by an average 
of 1.8% per annum. Since then, growth has 
averaged half that at 0.7% (Chart 31).  
Productivity is not only crucial for long-term growth 
but also household income. Whilst a tight labour 
market can put upward pressure on wages, if there 
is little wealth created more generally, the scope 
for businesses to award pay increases is limited 
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Chart 32: RBS/FAI Business Monitor shows some tentative 
signs of improved conditions  
 
 Source: FAI/RBS Scottish Business Monitor 
 
 
 
 
Chart 33: Net balance of firm responses to costs 
Source: FAI/RBS Scottish Business Monitor
 
 
 
Chart 34: Oil and Gas sector optimism 2010-2016: Grounds 
for cautious optimism? 
 
 Source: FAI/A&GCC 
 
 
 
 
Outlook  
If the data for the tail-end of 2016 was 
disappointing, more up-to-date indicators suggest 
that the economy did grow in early 2017, albeit at 
a slow pace.  
The FAI-RBS Business Monitor for Q1 2017 shows 
an increase in the net balance of firms reporting 
improving repeat business and new business 
volumes. That being said, the net balance figures 
of below +10 are still low by historical standards 
(Chart 32) 
As Chart 17 highlighted, the Bank of Scotland PMI 
has continued to remain positive but well behind 
the UK. Similarly, the Federation of Small 
Business confidence index, whilst improving in 
Scotland, was still negative overall, and at -3.8 
points was below the UK value of +15 points.  
In manufacturing, the latest CBI Industrial Trends 
survey pointed to relatively robust growth in output 
but cost pressures from rising prices are beginning 
to pose a concern.  
This is now a common theme. The upcoming FAI-
RBS Scottish Business Monitor for Q2 2017 
indicates rising costs for 56% of businesses while 
only 6% reported a fall. Cost pressures were most 
acute in tourism and distribution ± see Chart 33. A 
net balance of 49% of firms expect costs to 
increase in the next six months. 
The outlook for oil and gas companies is a little 
more positive than in recent months.  
We are now well into the third year of the current 
low oil price cycle. Investment has fallen 
significantly and exploration levels remain low.  
There are signs however, that the restructuring in 
the sector has led to some modest improvements 
in sentiment ± as demonstrated by the latest 
results from our regular Oil and Gas Survey.  Our 
judgement is that the outlook for the North Sea is 
slightly more positive ± or at least less negative ± 
than 12 months ago (Chart 34).  
  
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1
2014 2015 2016 2017
Ne
t B
al
a
nc
e
 
(> 
0 
Po
si
tiv
e
 
ne
w
/re
pe
a
t b
us
in
e
s)
Vol of repeat business
Vol of new business
Fraser of Allander Institute Economic Commentary, June 2017  
17 
 
Chart 35: Consumer Confidence remains negative in 
Scotland and gap with UK remains wide 
 
 Source: GfK
 
 
 
Chart 36: Key driver of lower consumer confidence appears 
to be deterioration in expectations for economic outlook  
 
 Source: Scottish Government, State of the Economy Report
 
 
 
Chart 37: Fall in retail sales index ± Q4 2016  
 
 Source: Scottish Government, Q1 Retail Sales Index
 
In contrast to the slightly more positive sentiment 
within the business community, levels of consumer 
confidence in Scotland have continued to slide.  
The GfK Consumer Confidence Index (where 0 = 
balance) was -13 in May, well below the UK index 
(which whilst also negative was -5).  
7KH6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQW¶VRZQLQGLFDWRU of 
confidence fell again in Q1 2017 (Chart 36).  
As mentioned above, this does not just appear to 
be a London factor. Lord Ashcroft included 
questions of economic confidence in an opinion 
poll of around 40,000 households across the UK - 
3,500 in Scotland ± during the UK General 
Election. Scotland had the lowest proportion of 
respondents positive about the economic outlook 
of any part of GB (NB: the survey did not include 
Northern Ireland).   
,W¶VWKHUHIRUHXQVXUSULVLQJWKDWUHWDLOVDOHVILJXUHV
for Scotland ± one early component of the Scottish 
GDP series ± declined in early 2017 pushing that 
sector into recession for the first time since 2012 
(Chart 37). 
Uncertainty will continue to have an impact on the 
performance of the Scottish economy. How the big 
political issues ± and in particular, the Brexit 
negotiations and prospects of an independence 
referendum ± play out will have a material impact 
on the outlook. 
This is not to say that one particular outcome is 
better than the other. It is simply that with 
uncertainty of such a magnitude in play, we cannot 
expect the processes themselves not to have an 
impact, irrespective of the end result.  
Our latest nowcast ± which utilise the most up to 
GDWHµKDUG¶DQGµVRIW¶GDWDRQWKH6FRWWLVKHFRQRP\
± currently estimates growth in 2017 Q1 of 
between 0.2% and 0.3%. That is within the margin 
by which our nowcast model has tended to be 
more optimistic than the 1st estimate of GDP 
produced by the Scottish Government during 
2016. If this continues to hold, this would suggest 
that QH[WZHHN¶V*'3HVWLPDWHIRUQ1 could well 
be pretty close to zero.  
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Table 8: FAI forecast Scottish GVA growth (%) 2017 to 
2019 
 2017 2018 2019 
GVA 1.2 1.4 1.6 
Production 1.4 1.6 1.8 
Construction 0.7 0.8 1.0 
Services 1.2 1.3 1.6 
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute 
 
 
 
Chart 38: Growth to remain below trend through forecast 
 
 
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute 
 
* Actual data to Q4 2016, central forecast with forecast uncertainty 
for 2017 ± 2019 
Uncertainty bands sourced from accuracy of past forecasts at 
different forecast horizons 
 
 
 
Table 9: FAI revised forecast %-point change from March 
2017 forecast by sector, 2017 to 2019 
 2017 2018 2019 
GVA +0.08 +0.09 +0.03 
Production +0.03 +0.12 +0.04 
Construction +0.09 +0.07 +0.02 
Services +0.10 +0.08 +0.03 
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute
 
Our forecasts 
As in the past, we report a central forecast but 
calculate uncertainty bands to set out a likely 
range within which we predict Scottish economic 
growth will lie. In our view, it is this range that 
should be just as much the focus of discussion as 
specific point estimates.  
In other words, it is entirely possible that the 
Scottish economy could grow close to 2% this 
year, but our assessment is that the probability of 
that happening is lower than our central projection.  
Overall, our forecasts are little changed on March.  
Our assessment is still the same - we believe that 
the Scottish economy will grow this year, but 
predict that such growth will remain below trend for 
the foreseeable future.   
We expect that growth figures for 2016 are likely to 
be revised up slightly when new data becomes 
available to be more in line with business surveys 
and other indicators of activity.  
The two major judgement calls continue to be the 
outlook for the oil and gas sector and the impact of 
any Brexit-induced uncertainty impacting more 
sharply on investment and economic confidence.  
A technical adjustment means that we now expect 
2017 growth to be marginally stronger than we 
forecast in March as the economy makes up some 
lost output from a weaker 2016 than anticipated. 
Our central forecast is for growth of around 
1.2% this year.  
Services will continue to make the greatest overall 
contribution to growth over the next few years. 
Financial services and business services in 
particular should benefit. Tourist facing services ± 
such as hotels ± should also do well from both 
increased overseas visitors and a rise in 
staycations. In contrast, retail is likely to continue 
to be squeezed by falling household incomes.  
We also expect a pick-up in production as both the 
oil and gas supply chain stabilises and the recent 
downturns in manufacturing begin to ease off.  
More in depth forecasts ± including by 
sector and region ± are available as part of 
our new FAI Membership Scheme. Email: 
fraser@strath.ac.uk for more info. 
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Chart 39: Contribution to forecast ± growth picking up 
toward end of forecast horizon 
 
 
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute 
 
 
 
Table 10: Latest growth forecasts for the UK economy  
 2017 2018 2019 
Bank of England 1.9 1.7 1.8 
OBR 2.0 1.6 1.7 
NIESR 1.7 1.9 2.0 
European Commission 1.8 1.3 n/a 
IMF 2.0 1.5 1.6 
Oxford Economics 1.7 1.4 1.6 
ITEM Club 1.8 1.2 1.4 
CBI 1.3 n/a n/a 
Source: HM Treasury 
 
 
 
Table 11: FAI labour market forecast to 2019 
 2017 2018 2019 
Employee Jobs 2,436,450 2,476,450 2,514,700 
% employee job 
growth over 
year 
+0.3% +1.6 +1.5 
ILO 
unemployment 117,000 134,300 143,750 
Unemployment 
Rate (%)1 4.4 5.0 5.3 
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute 
Notes:  
Absolute numbers are rounded to the nearest 50.  
1
 Rate calculated as total ILO unemployment divided by total of 
economically active population aged 16 and over. 
 
 
 
Food and drink should continue to perform strongly 
as the low value of Sterling continues to help 
support competiveness.  
We have broadly maintained our central 
forecast for growth of 1.4% in 2018 (up from 
1.3%) and revised up slightly our outlook for 
2019 to 1.6% (from 1.4% in March). Some of the 
revisions for later years are driven, in part, by more 
positive projections for the UK economy (Chart 11) 
which spill-over into Scotland and a slightly more 
positive outlook for investment and exports toward 
the end of the forecast horizon.  
We expect the growth gap between Scotland and 
the UK to remain over the next three years, but to 
close slightly as the effects of the slowdown in oil 
and gas are reduced (Table 10). 
On the components of demand, we continue to 
expect uncertainty to dampen investment this year 
but by slightly less than previously thought. Some 
of this will reflect delayed plans as firms await the 
details of the Brexit negotiations. Once this is 
resolved, a pick-up is likely.  
Consumption will remain the biggest contributor to 
growth, although it will not be as healthy as in the 
last couple of years as higher inflation, combined 
with low earnings growth, feeds through to lower 
household spending.  
Net exports will continue to benefit from the 
depreciation in Sterling, although, as we 
highlighted above, the scale of any pick-up will 
depend upon able Scottish companies are to take 
advantage of the opportunity that this provides.   
We expect unemployment to rise slightly toward a 
level consistent with the medium-term trend of 
around 5%. Growth in the number of jobs is 
forecast to continue, but to be weak compared to 
historical levels.  
As we highlight above, recent unemployment 
numbers have been driven by a sharp rise in 
inactivity. To the extent that this is reversed, the 
unemployment rate may rise more sharply.  
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Policy Context 
The Scottish Parliament enters recess at the end 
of June. When it returns it will face a number of 
important policy decisions, not least in the 
Programme for Government and the Budget to 
follow later on in the year.  
As we have highlighted, these decisions will take 
place at a time of ongoing economic challenge, not 
just here in Scotland but across the UK as the 
negotiations for Brexit reach a crucial phase.  
During such times, it will be easy for the debate 
DERXW6FRWODQG¶VHFRQRP\WREHVLGH-tracked by 
constitutional wrangling.  
This cannot be used as a justification ± from 
across the political spectrum ± for not undertaking 
an urgent and frank assessment of the best 
policies to support the Scottish economy.  
The fragile economic backdrop means that this is a 
necessity. But even more importantly, in our view, 
debate over the long-term economic challenges 
and opportunities facing Scotland has been 
pushed to the side-lines.  
And this is a concern. Over the last ten years, 
output per head in Scotland increased by just 1.2% 
(that is in total not per year). In the preceding 
seven years, it had grown 17%.  
0RUHRYHU+RO\URRG¶VQHZSRZHUVPHDQVWKDW
6FRWODQG¶VHFRQRPLFSHUIRUPDQFHPDWWHUVPRUH
than ever before. Even small variations in relative 
performance will translate into hundreds of millions 
of pounds in tax revenues within a short period of 
time.  
Scotland is without question a successful nation. It 
is in the OECD top 20 in terms of income per head 
and near the top in the UK on most long-term 
indicators behind London and the South East.  
The country has substantial natural resources, a 
skilled workforce and strengths in many sectors.  
But it has been widely recognised by successive 
Scottish administrations that we lag our 
competitors in key areas.  
Back in 2007, the Scottish Government published 
an economic strategy which aligned the public 
sector toward sustainable economic growth.  
It contained a series of targets ± for growth, 
productivity, participation and population; and for 
levels of inequality and sustainability.    
10 years on, on most targets ± with the exception 
of population where we now have a record number 
of people living in Scotland and climate change ± 
the economy is arguably treading water.  
Chart 40: Scotland vs. UK growth differential ± above line 
= Scotland growing more quickly than UK 
 
 
Source: Scottish Government/FAI calculations
 
 
For example, in terms of the key target to match 
WKH8.¶VJURZWKUDWHWKLVKDVRQO\EHHQDFKLHYHG
30% of the time since 2007.  
We see little evidence that productivity in Scotland 
has fundamentally improved. Yes, the gap with the 
UK has narrowed but this LVGRZQWRWKH8.¶V
exceptionally weak performance and the fact that 
Scotland has created fewer jobs in recent years. 
$QGZKLOVWZHKDYHµPRYHGLQWRWKHnd TXDUWLOH¶LQ
the OECD, this is simply because we fell into the 
3rd quartile a few years ago. 
Scotland is likely to fall back down the ranking with 
productivity falling in 2016. And even then, the gap 
with the top performing OECD countries is still 
20%. 
Whilst we have seen a rise in innovation activity, 
on business R&D, Scotland ranks 9th out of the 12 
English regions or devolved nations in the UK and 
9th in terms of new business registrations.  
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Chart 41: 6FRWODQG¶VSURGXFWLYLW\UDQNLQJLQWKH2(&' 
 
 
Source: Scottish Government, OECD/FAI calculations
 
On the labour market, the gap between the top 
and worst performing local authorities is still a 
massive 15%-points and the gap with the top 
performing countries in the OECD remains.  
Chart 42: 6FRWODQG¶VODERXUPDUNHWUDQNLQJ 
 
 
Source: Scottish Government, OECD/FAI calculations
 
Given recent challenges ± from the upheaval in 
financial services and oil and gas ± the fact that 
Scotland has maintained its position on many 
international rankings can be viewed as a success.    
But the ambition must be to do better than that.   
A renewed focus on how the Scottish and UK 
Governments can use the powers at their disposal 
to support the economy is needed.  
We also need a robust evaluation of existing policy 
priorities and their success (or otherwise).  
Government action plans and strategies are all 
well and good, but we often struggle to really know 
µZKDWZRUNV¶ 
And even when we do, the task of delivery and, 
quite often, the need to shift scarce resources from 
one area to the next, is a challenge  
In our view, a greater role for independent analysis 
will help. 7KH6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQW¶Vrecent 
proposals as part of Phase 2 of its Enterprise and 
Skills Review to improve analytical capacity across 
the enterprise and skills system is welcome, up to 
a point.  
Better sharing of data and coordination of research 
will clearly be beneficial.  
But the current proposals come with a risk of 
duplication and/or simply re-presenting existing 
material in a new way, in a new format to a new 
body. What bite will it have?  
In our view, the policy making process should be 
improved by insisting that every policy intervention 
± not just those of agencies but of the Scottish 
Government itself ± be underpinned, as a matter of 
course, by a transparent evaluation framework.  
This would help avoid policies being designed, 
expanded, and defended upon assertion rather 
than evidence.   
At the same time, as every major policy is 
developed, policymakers should set out how 
progress will be monitored and assessed (with a 
dedicated budget ring-fenced for such purposes). 
Having better data is one thing, what you do with it 
is even more important. Productivity commissions 
± such as in Australia and New Zealand ± are 
designed to do just that with more independent 
research, advice and performance monitoring than 
we do in Scotland.  
With the right ambition there is an opportunity to 
take a IUHVKORRNDWKRZEHVWWRDGGUHVV6FRWODQG¶V
long-term economic challenges (and to take 
advantage of new opportunities that will emerge).
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For regular analysis on the Scottish economy and public finances please see our blog: 
www.fraserofallander.org 
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$SULPHURQWKH6FRWWLVK3DUOLDPHQW¶VQHZILVFDOSRZHUV
what are they, how will they work, and what are the 
challenges? 
David Eiser, Fraser of Allander Institute, University of Strathclyde 
Abstract 
This article provides an overview of ScotlanG¶VQHZ)LVFDO)UDPHZRUN7KH)LVFDO)UDPHZRUN
sets out how the new powers devolved to the Scottish Parliament in the Scotland Acts 2012 and 
2016 will be made operational.  It provides a brief overview of the history of fiscal devolution to 
Scotland since the establishment of the Scottish Parliament in 1999.  From relying on a Block 
Grant from Westminster to fund virtually all its expenditure, the Scottish Parliament now has a 
range of revenue raising powers including substantial flexibility to vary income tax rates and 
thresholds; moreover the Scottish budget will in future be much more closely linked to the 
performance of the Scottish economy. In addition, the Scottish Parliament will gain a range of 
powers in relation to social security.  The mechanisms aQGPHWKRGVIRUDGMXVWLQJ6FRWODQG¶V
Block Grant ± %ORFN*UDQW$GMXVWPHQWV%*$¶V± the forecasting role of the new Scottish Fiscal 
&RPPLVVLRQDQG6FRWODQG¶VQHZFDSLWDOERUURZLQJUHVRXUFHDQGFDVKPDQDJHPHQWSRZHUVDUH
all outlined. .  Finally, the impOLFDWLRQVIRU6FRWODQG¶VEXGJHWSURFHVVDQGZKDWWKHQHZ
DUUDQJHPHQWVFRXOGPHDQIRUWKH6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQW¶VDELOLW\WRLPSDFWRQ6FRWODQG¶VHFRQRP\
and growth rate is discussed.    
I Introduction 
Substantial new fiscal powers are being devolved to the Scottish Parliament, as a result of the 
Scotland Acts 2012 and 2016. These powers include the devolution and assignment of 
significant tax revenues, and devolution of new social security powers. 
The devolution of these powers requires changes to be made to the way that the Scottish block 
grant is calculated. New arrangements for fiscal forecasting have to be put in place. And the 
Scottish Government requires more extensive borrowing and cash management tools to manage 
budget volatility and uncertainty. These DUUDQJHPHQWVDUHVHWRXWLQ6FRWODQG¶V)LVFDO
Framework, published in 20161. 
Implementing the new powers also requires substantial technical and administrative work, much 
of which is ongoing. And it will require changes to the way in which Scottish budgets are 
presented to and scrutinised by the Scottish Parliament. 
                                                          
1
 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-agreement-between-the-scottish-government-and-the-united-kingdom-
government-on-the-scottish-governments-fiscal-framework  
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7KLVSDSHURXWOLQHVWKH6FRWWLVK3DUOLDPHQW¶VQHZSRZHUVWKHNH\HOHPHQWVRIWKH)LVFDO
Framework that enable the implementation of these new powers, and the technical and 
administrative issues that are still ongoing. It describes some of the budgetary opportunities that 
the new fiscal arrangements present, and also some of the risks to which the Scottish budget is 
now exposed. 
II Background to tax devolution in Scotland: how did we get to where we are? 
When the Scottish Parliament was established it had substantial spending responsibilities but 
limited responsibility for revenue raising (i.e. taxation). On spending, the parliament has 
substantial responsibilities in relation to health, education, justice and policing, economic 
development, the environment, and culture and sport. On tax however, only two relatively small 
property taxes were determined in Scotland ± the Council Tax (a tax on domestic property) and 
Non-Domestic Rates, a tax on business property. 
5HYHQXHVIURPWKHVHWZRWD[HVDPRXQWHGWRDURXQGSHUFHQWRIWKH6FRWWLVK3DUOLDPHQW¶V
spending budget, with the remainder of the budget provided by the block grant from the UK 
Government.  
The Calman Commission report, published in 2009, argued that this imbalance between 
spending responsibility and revenue raising responsibility was problematic. It noted2 µFunding by 
block grant alone means that while the Scottish Parliament is completely accountable for the 
spending of its budget, it is not accountable for the total of that budget or how it is raised; it has 
no fiscal powers that can be used as policy instruments and it does not have a direct financial 
VWDNHLQWKHSHUIRUPDQFHRIWKH6FRWWLVKHFRQRP\¶ .  
The Calman Commission recommended that this imbalance should be addressed through the 
partial devolution of income tax to the Scottish Parliament, alongside devolution of stamp duty 
land tax (a tax on property transactions) and landfill tax (a tax on waste to landfill). These 
recommendations were passed into legislation through the Scotland Act 2012. Scottish Landfill 
Tax and the Land and Buildings Transaction Tax (LBTT, the replacement for Stamp Duty in 
Scotland) came into operation in April 2014. The arrangements for the partial devolution of 
income tax only operated for one year, 2016/17, before being superseded by subsequent 
legislation. 
Following the 2014 Scottish Referendum, the Smith Commission was established to agree which 
fiscal powers to devolve to the Scottish Parliament. The Smith Commission3 argued that tax 
GHFHQWUDOLVDWLRQZRXOGPDNHWKH6FRWWLVK3DUOLDPHQWµPRUHDFFRXQWDEOHDQGUHVSRQVLEOHIRUWKH
                                                          
2
 Commission on Scottish Devolution, 2009, para 3.87 
3
 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20151202171017/http://www.smith-commission.scot/wp-
content/uploads/2014/11/The_Smith_Commission_Report-1.pdf  
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HIIHFWVRILWVSROLF\GHFLVLRQVDQGWKHLUUHVXOWLQJEHQHILWVRUFRVWV¶DQGWKDWLWZRXOGµVWUHQJWKHQ
the Scottish ParliDPHQW¶VDELOLW\WRSXUVXHLWVRZQYLVLRQJRDOVDQGREMHFWLYHV¶ 
The Smith Commission recommended: 
x 7KDWµ1RQ6DYLQJV1RQ-'LYLGHQG¶161'LQFRPHWD[UHYHQXHVVKRXOGEHWUDQVIHUUHGWR
the Scottish Parliament. NSND income tax revenues account for around 92% of all 
income tax revenues raised in Scotland (and include the tax paid on income from 
earnings, self-employment, pension income and property income). The Commission 
recommended that the Scottish Parliament be able to vary income tax rates and bands in 
Scotland without constraint. But the UK Government will retain authority to determine the 
income tax base. This means that the setting of the Personal Allowance, and the way in 
which the pensions tax relief is defined for example, are determined by the UK 
Government. 
x That Air Passenger Duty (APD) should be devolved in full.  
x It also recommended that a share of VAT collected in Scotland should be assigned to the 
Scottish Parliament. Specifically, the first ten pence of Standard Rate VAT and the first 
2.5 pence of reduced rate VAT to be assigned to the Scottish Parliament. Given that the 
Standard and Reduced rates of VAT are currently 20% and 5% respectively, this means 
that under current policy, half the VAT revenues raised in Scotland will be assigned to the 
Scottish budget. 
x It also recommended the devolution of Aggregates Levy, in full. 
7KH6PLWK&RPPLVVLRQ¶VUHFRPPHQGDWLRQVZHUHHQDFWHGWKURXJKWKH6FRWODQG$FW 
III 6XPPDU\RIWKH6FRWWLVK3DUOLDPHQW¶VHYROYLQJUHYHQXHUHVSRQVLELOLWLHV 
The Scottish ParlLDPHQW¶VQHZWD[SRZHUVDUHEHLQJLPSOHPHQWHGRQDVWDJHGEDVLVRYHUWKH
next few years. NSND income tax will be devolved to the Scottish Parliament from April 2017, 
with APD being devolved in 2018 and VAT in 2019. The staging of the introduction of the tax 
powers largely reflects the time taken to resolve various administration and implementation 
issues specific to each tax. 
Table 1 summarises the extent of existing and planned tax devolution to the Scottish Parliament.  
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Table 1: Devolved, shared and assigned tax revenues in Scotland 
Tax Date of 
transfer/ 
devolution 
Revenues 
raised 
2015/16 (£m) 
Degree of control by 
Scottish Parliament 
Responsibility for 
collection 
Council Tax 1999 £2,100 Fully devolved; complete 
autonomy. Local government 
Non-Domestic 
Rates 1999 £1,900 
Fully devolved; complete 
autonomy. Local government 
Land and 
Business 
Transactions 
Tax (LBTT) 
2015 £416 Fully devolved; complete 
autonomy. Revenue Scotland 
Landfill Tax 2015 £147 Fully devolved; complete 
autonomy. Revenue Scotland 
Income tax 2017 £11,214 
The Scottish Government 
can set the rates and 
bands. But the UK 
Government defines the tax 
base and sets allowances. 
HMRC 
Air Passenger 
Duty  2018 £275 
Fully devolved; complete 
autonomy Revenue Scotland 
VAT 2019 £5,000 Assigned revenues; no 
autonomy HMRC 
Aggregates 
Levy tbc £53 
Fully devolved; complete 
autonomy Revenue Scotland 
Source: Government Expenditure and Revenue Scotland (GERS); author analysis 
A new Scottish tax agency, Revenue Scotland, has been established to collect revenues for the 
fully devolved Scottish taxes (LBTT, Scottish Landfill Tax, Aggregates Levy, and Air Passenger 
'XW\ZKLFKWKH6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQWKDVDQQRXQFHGZLOOEHUHQDPHGµ$LU'HSDUWXUH7D[¶
Revenues from the partially devolved income tax and the assigned VAT in Scotland will continue 
to be collected by HMRC. 
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IV 7KH6FRWWLVK3DUOLDPHQW¶VQHZVRFLDOVHFXULW\SRZHUV 
In addition to tax devolution, some devolution of social security benefits is also taking place. A 
number of UK-administered benefits, mainly related to ill-health, disability and care are being 
devolved to the Scottish Parliament. Spending on these benefits in Scotland by the UK 
Government in 2015/16 totalled around £3bn (Table 2). 
Table 2: Expenditure on social security benefits being devolved to the Scottish Parliament 
  Expenditure, £m 
  2015-16 
Disability Living Allowance 1,399 
Attendance Allowance 487 
Carer's Allowance 224 
Winter Fuel Payment 180 
Personal Independence Payment 315 
Industrial Injuries Disablement Benefit 91 
Severe Disablement Allowance 49 
Discretionary Housing Payments 13 
Cold Weather Payment 3 
Funeral Payment 4 
Sure Start Maternity Grant 3 
Total expenditure on social security 
benefits to be devolved 2,768 
Source: Government Expenditure and Revenue Scotland 2015/16 
A new Social Security Bill will be introduced in the Scottish Parliament imminently.  This will 
provide the framework for the establishment of a new social security system in Scotland. The 
implementation dates for any new powers will be agreed by the Joint Ministerial Group on 
Welfare. 
Additionally, the Scottish Government has already gained the power to: 
x create new benefits (except pensions) in areas not otherwise connected with reserved 
matters 
x top up reserved benefits  
x make discretionary payments or provide discretionary assistance to meet certain needs 
x amend some employment support schemes 
Fraser of Allander Institute Economic Commentary, June 2017  
29 
 
x make changes to the amount of Universal Credit (UC) for the costs of rented 
accommodation, and the timing and recipients of payments. 
Since 1 April 2017, Discretionary Housing Payments have also been devolved. 
V Adjustments to the block grant for tax 
7KH6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQW¶VEORFNJUDQWIURP:HVWPLQVWHUZLOOFRQWLQXHWREHGHWHUPLQHGE\WKH
Barnett Formula. 
However, the block grant will be adjusted (i.e. reduced) to take account of the new taxes being 
devolved to the Scottish Parliament.  
+RZZLOOWKLVKDSSHQ")RUHDFKRIWKHGHYROYHGDQGDVVLJQHGWD[HVDµEORFNJUDQWDGMXVWPHQW¶
(BGA) will be calculated. The BGA is effectively a measure of the tax revenues that the UK 
Government has foregone as a result of transferring the tax in question to the Scottish 
Parliament.  
The process for calculating the BGAs is set out in detail in the Fiscal Framework4. 
The BGA is calculated for each tax separately, and consists of two elements: an initial deduction 
and an indexation mechanism. 
The initial deduction is simply equal to the tax revenues collected in Scotland in the year 
immediately prior to the devolution of the tax power. For example, if income tax is devolved in 
2017-18, the initial deduction is equal to income tax receipts in Scotland in 2016-17. 
But what should the BGA be in 2017-18 and any year thereafter? This is where the indexation 
mechanism comes in. Its purpose is to provide a measure of the rate DWZKLFKµFRPSDUDEOH
UHYHQXHV¶KDYHJURZQRUGHFOLQHGLQWKHUHVWRIWKH8.EHWZHHQDQGRUDQ\
subsequent year).  
The basic idea is that the BGA should grow at the same rate as the growth in comparable 
revenues in rUK.  
To calculate the BGA for income tax in 2017/18, the indexation mechanism (i.e. the growth rate 
of the rUK tax) is applied to the initial deduction. The BGA in 2017/18 thus provides an estimate 
of the level of income tax revenue that would have been raised in Scotland in 2017/18, had tax 
                                                          
4
 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-agreement-between-the-scottish-government-and-the-united-kingdom-
government-on-the-scottish-governments-fiscal-framework  
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policy been the same in Scotland as in rUK, and had income tax revenues grown at the same 
rate in Scotland as in rUK between 2016/17 and 2017/18. 
How is the indexation mechanism actually calculated? During the development of the Fiscal 
Framework, there was some disagreement between the Scottish and UK Governments over the 
best way to calculate the indexation mechanism. In the end, a compromise was reached. Over 
the period to 2020/21, the indexation mechanism will be calculated according to the so-called 
µ,QGH[HGSHUFDSLWD¶,3&PHWKRG%XWWKHUHVXOWVIURPDVHFRQGPHWKRGWKHµ&RPSDUDEOH
0HWKRG¶ZLOODOVREHSXEOLVKHGDORQJVLGHWKH,3&HVWLPDWHV5. 
8QGHUWKH&RPSDUDEOH0HWKRGWKHFKDQJHLQ6FRWODQG¶V%*$LVGHWHUPLQHGE\Dtax-capacity 
adjusted population share of the change in rUK revenues. The population share LV6FRWODQG¶V
share of the UK population. Tax capacity is the amount of tax raised per person by a given 
V\VWHPRIWD[UDWHVDQGWKUHVKROGV6FRWODQG¶VWD[FDSDFLW\IRULQFRPHWDx (set out in the Fiscal 
)UDPHZRUNLVRIU8.¶V 
So under the Comparable Method, if rUK income tax revenues increase by £10 billion between 
DQ\WZR\HDUVDQGLI6FRWODQG¶VSRSXODWLRQVKDUHLVDQG6FRWODQG¶VWD[FDSDFLW\IRULQFRPH
tax is 87.7% oIU8.¶VWKHQ6FRWODQG¶V%*$ZRXOGLQFUHDVHE\PEQ[[ 
The IPC method indexes the BGA to the growth in tax revenues per capita in rUK and the rate of 
population growth in Scotland. For example, if rUK revenues per capita grow by 5% and the 
Scottish population grows by 1%, the BGA grows by approximately 6%6. 
What is the difference between IPC and CM? 
The principle difference between the CM and IPC indexation mechanisms is the way that they 
treat differences in relative population growth between Scotland and rUK. 
The IPC method has the feature that, if tax revenues per capita grow at the same rate in 
Scotland and in rUK, then the Scottish budget will be identical to what it would have been without 
tax devolution7, even if the Scottish population grows more slowly than the rUK population. In 
contrast, the implication of the Comparable Method is that the Scottish budget loses out if 
Scotland posts a relatively slower rate of population growth that rUK. 
To see this, suppose that revenues in rUK are growing only due to population growth ± revenues 
per capita are constant ± DQG6FRWODQG¶VSRSXODWLRQDQGUHYHQXHVDUHFRQVWDQW7KH&RPSDUDEOH
0HWKRGLQFUHDVHV6FRWODQG¶V%*$E\DSRSXODWLRQVKDUHRIWKHU8.WD[UHYHQXHLQFUHDVH%XW
                                                          
5
 For further details about how these methods work, see https://www.ifs.org.uk/uploads/publications/wps/wp201605.pdf   
6
 The precise rate of growth of the BGA is 6.05%, calculated as (1.01)*(1.05)*100 ± 100.  
7
 This is because, with equal growth rates of per capita revenues, the amount of tax raised in Scotland is equal to the BGA, so 
the two effects cancel out. 
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the IPC method ZRXOGQRWLQFUHDVH6FRWODQG¶V%*$DWDOODVWKHUHKDVEHHQQRLQFUHDVHLQU8.
revenues per capita, and no change in Scottish population).  
Over the period to 2020/21, the block grant adjustments will be calculated by both the CM and 
the IPC methods. Thus LWZLOOEHSRVVLEOHWRFRPSDUH6FRWODQG¶V%*$VXQGHUERWKLQGH[DWLRQ
methods. Over the period to 2020/21 however, it is the IPC mechanism which will ultimately 
determine the BGA. 
The method for indexing the BGAs after 2021±22 will be negotiated after the 2021 Scottish 
Parliamentary elections.  
VI ,PSOLFDWLRQVRIWKHULVNDQGUHZDUGVWUXFWXUHLQ6FRWODQG¶V)LVFDO)UDPHZRUN 
What are the implications of these BGAs? 
Remember that the BGAs for each tax are deducted from the ScoWWLVK*RYHUQPHQW¶VEORFNJUDQW
What is added back into the Scottish budget are the revenues that are actually raised from each 
tax in Scotland. 
 
 
The key implication of the BGA arrangement is that, if the sum of the revenues raised from the 
devolved/ assigned taxes is greater than the sum of the BGAs, then the Scottish budget will be 
better off than it would have been without tax devolution.  
This could happen under two circumstances: if the tax base grows relatively more quickly in 
Scotland than in rUK; or if tax rates in Scotland increase relative to those in rUK.  
Of course the reverse could happen ± Scottish revenues may grow relatively more slowly than 
those in rUK, in which case the Scottish budget will be worse off than it would have been without 
tax devolution. 
7KHSULQFLSOHRIWKHQHZILVFDODUUDQJHPHQWVLVWKDWWKH6FRWWLVKEXGJHWVKRXOGµbenefit in fulO¶
from policy decisions by the Scottish Government that increase revenues, and conversely bear 
the costs in full of policy decisions that reduce revenues. This is fine as a principle but the reality 
of the arrangements is that the Scottish budget bears in full the effects of any differential growth 
in Scottish revenues relative to rUK revenues, regardless of the causes of any differential growth. 
Whilst the Scottish Government would certainly hope to be able to implement policy to grow the 
Scottish economy and tax base, the link between policy and growth is often weak, and many of 
the factors determining tax revenue growth are only dependent on policy to a limited extent. 
Block grant 
Scottish 
budget 
Tax revenues 
raised in 
Scotland 
Block grant 
adjustment 
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At a time when there are structural weaknesses in the Scottish economy (arising in part from 
developments in the offshore oil and gas sector and its Scottish supply chain), these risks are 
stark. 
$QDO\VLVXVLQJWKH)UDVHURI$OODQGHU¶VPLFURVLPXODWLRQPRGHORIWKH6FRWWLVKHFRQRP\IRU
example shows that, if wages in Scotland grew just a third of a percentage point more slowly 
than those in rUK in one year, then income tax revenues raised in Scotland would be £50 million 
lower than the income tax BGA. If wages in Scotland grow one percentage point more slowly 
than those in rUK in one year (which is certainly not outwith the realms of the historic 
experience), the difference between Scottish revenues and the BGA would be £150 million. And 
of course if these differences were to persist over time, then the revenue differential would 
increase exponentially.  
6LPLODULVVXHVDULVHZLWKWKHVPDOOHUWD[HVWRR,PDJLQHWKDW6FRWODQG¶V/%77UHYHQXHVSHUFDSLWD
grow at 10% per year. This sounds great. But if the equivalent rUK Stamp Duty revenues per 
FDSLWDJURZDWSHU\HDUGULYHQE\DERRPLQ/RQGRQ¶VKLJK-end property market, the BGA 
for LBTT will increase more quickly than Scottish revenues. Hence, the Scottish budget would be 
worse off than it would have been without tax devolution. 
2IFRXUVHWKH6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQWGRHVQ¶WMXVWKDYHWRVLWEDFNDQGKRSHIRUIDVWHUUHYHQXH
growth. It can choose to implement policies ± relating to the devolved taxes specifically or under 
any of its other devolved competences more generally ± to grow the Scottish tax base (or to 
achieve other policy goals, such as a different distribution of income). 
This additional policy flexibility provides new opportunities to the Scottish Government to pursue 
an alternative policy agenda. But a clear complication is that there is a large degree of 
uncertainty about how particular policies might influence the future growth of Scottish revenues. 
Some will inevitably argue that reductions in the burden of taxation will stimulate growth and 
increase revenues in the long term, while others will argue that the most effective way to raise 
tax revenue is to raise tax rates.  
There are a large number of uncertainties about how individuals and businesses in Scotland 
might respond to particular tax policy changes. One of the impacts of the devolved tax powers is 
that we can expect more debates about the revenue effects of tax changes in future! 
VII Adjustments to the block grant for social security powers 
As well as making deductions to the Barnett-determined block grant for the new taxes, additions 
will also be made to the block grant to reflect the new social security powers. 
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7KHµEORFNJUDQWDGMXVWPHQWV¶IRUVRFLDOVHFXULW\DUHLQWHQGHGWRUHIOHFWthe expenditure foregone 
by the UK Government as a result of transferring each social security power to the Scottish 
Parliament. 
6LPLODUO\WRWKH%*$VIRUWD[WKH%*$IRUVRFLDOVHFXULW\SRZHUVLQYROYHVDµEDVHOLQHDGGLWLRQ¶WR
the Scottish budget (which is equal to UK Government spending on the benefits to be devolved 
in the year prior to devolution), and an indexation mechanism.  
7KHLQGH[DWLRQZLOOQRUPDOO\EHEDVHGRQWKHµ%DUQHWW)RUPXOD¶ZKHUHE\WKH%*$VLQVXFKDZD\
that the Scottish budget will bHLQFUHDVHGE\DSRSXODWLRQVKDUHRIWKHVSHQGLQJRQµFRPSDUDEOH¶
benefits in rUK.   
But for a transitional period to 2020/21, the BGAs for social security will be calculated according 
to the IPC indexation mechanism. This will calculate the change in ScotODQG¶VJUDQWIRUGHYROYHG
ZHOIDUHEDVHGRQWKHSHUFHQWDJHFKDQJHLQSHUFDSLWDVSHQGLQJRQWKHµFRPSDUDEOH¶EHQHILWVLQ
U8.DQGWKHFKDQJHLQ6FRWODQG¶VSRSXODWLRQ 
VIII Forecasting revenues 
As we have just seen, the determination of the Scottish budget will in future be significantly more 
complex than it has been in the past. In the past the resources available to the Scottish 
Government essentially depended on the block grant from Westminster. In future, in addition to 
the block grant itself, the resources available to the Scottish Government will depend on a 
complex interaction between the revenues from taxes transferred to the Scottish Government, 
and the revenues from the equivalent taxes in the rest of the UK. 
In order to set its budget each year, and in order to undertake medium term financial planning, 
the Scottish Government will need forecasts of the Scottish revenues. 
The Scottish Fiscal Commission (SFC) has been established to make the Scottish forecasts. 
Twice each year, the SFC will make a 5-year forecast for each of the Scottish revenues, and for 
spending on the social security benefits being transferred to Scotland. The SFC will also make a 
forecast for growth in Scottish onshore GDP. 
The SFC was established as a statutory, non-Ministerial Department in April 2017 and is 
operationally independent of the Scottish Government. It will produce its first official forecasts 
later this year (2017), alongside the Scottish Budget.  
It is important to note that the SFC is only mandated to produce a single forecast for each tax. 
This will be based only on stated Scottish Government policy. In other words, the SFC cannot 
produce different forecasts to reflect alternative policy scenarios. 
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Of course the Scottish budget is not only determined by Scottish revenues. It is also determined 
by the BGAs, which are themselves determined by growth in comparable rUK revenues and 
social security spending. 
In order to set its budget each year, the Scottish Government will not only need forecasts for 
Scottish revenues, but also need forecasts for the BGAs. The BGA forecasts will be determined 
E\WKH8.2IILFHRI%XGJHW5HVSRQVLELOLW\¶V2%5¶VWD[IRUHFDVWVIRUU8.DQG':3H[SHQGLWXUH
forecasts for social security benefits.  
In its budget documentation, the Scottish Government will need to set out the forecasts for the 
Scottish taxes alongside the forecasts for the BGAs. 
IX Reconciliation 
Although income tax is being transferred to the Scottish Parliament, collection of income tax from 
Scottish taxpayers will continue to be undertaken by HMRC. How then will income tax revenues 
raised from Scottish taxpayers be transferred to the Scottish budget? 
In drawing up its draft budget in any given year, the Scottish Government will rely on forecasts of 
the revenues raised from the Scottish taxes (to be made by the Scottish Fiscal Commission), and 
a forecast of the block grant adjustments for each tax (which will be based on forecasts for the 
growth in rUK revenues made by the OBR).  
The UK Government will transfer to the Scottish GoYHUQPHQWWKH6)&¶Vforecast for income tax 
revenues; these will be drawn down throughout the financial year, whilst the UK Government will 
deduct from the block grant the forecast of the income tax BGA. 
Once outturn data on income tax revenues are available, the forecasts of both Scottish tax 
revenues and the income tax BGA will be reconciled to that outturn. These reconciliations might 
work in the same direction and offset each other; for example, outturn Scottish revenues that are 
lower than those forecast may simply be offset by lower than forecast rUK revenues, and hence 
a lower than forecast BGA. Of course it is possible that the reconciliation of Scottish revenues 
and BGA works in opposing directions, resulting in either a windfall gain or loss for the Scottish 
budget once reconciliation occurs. 
A key point however is that outturn data for income tax is not available until 15 months after the 
end of a financial year. Outturn data for 2017/18 for example will not be available until June 
2019. These outtuUQILJXUHVIRUZLOOWKHQQRWEHµUHFRQFLOHG¶ZLWKWKHIRUHFDVWXQWLOWKH
6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQW¶VEXGJHWRIWKHVXEVHTXHQWILQDQFLDO\HDULH 
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Two points are worth making: 
x First, these long (3-year) lags involved in reconciliation mean that accountability for the 
fiscal effects of policy decisions will often spill across parliamentary terms. 
x Second, note also that the Scottish budget bears the risk of forecast errors made by the 
OBR for rUK income tax. For example, consider the case where thH6)&¶VIRUHFDVWIRU
Scottish revenues corresponds exactly to outturn, but where the OBR forecast for rUK 
income tax revenue substantially underestimates subsequent rUK outturn figures. In this 
case, an upward reconciliation of the BGA would have to be made to a subsequent 
Scottish budget.  
A similar reconciliation process will be required in the case of VAT, once this is assigned to the 
Scottish budget. 
)RUWKHµIXOO\GHYROYHG¶UHYHQXHVWKDWDUHFROOHFWHGE\5HYHQXH6FRWODQGUHFRQFLOLDWLRQKDSSHQV
slightly differently. Because the revenues from these taxes are collected in Scotland by Revenue 
6FRWODQGDQGPDGHDYDLODEOHGLUHFWO\WRWKH6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQWµUHFRQFLOLDWLRQ¶KDSSHQV
continuously throughout the year, rather than as a one-off event. For the BGAs, there will be 
reconciliations between the forecast for the BGAs and the actual BGAs (based on actual rUK 
outturn data). These reconciliations will happen on a monthly basis. 
X Resource borrowing and cash management 
The devolution of revenue (and welfare spending) responsibility clearly exposes the Scottish 
budget to the risk of greater budget volatility. As we have seen, the complex process by which 
the Scottish budget is based on forecasts of Scottish revenues and BGAs, both of which are then 
reconciled to outturn, means that the Scottish Government may face a number of cash 
management issues. 
The Scottish Government has gained additional borrowing and cash management powers to deal 
with this uncertainty and volatility.  
Under the Fiscal Framework Agreement, the Scottish Government will have the ability to borrow 
up to £600m each year within a statutory overall limit for resource borrowing of £1.75 billion. A 
fairly complex set of rules govern how these powers can be used in these different 
circumstances: 
x There is an annual limit of £500 million on borrowing for in-year cash management (such 
borrowing allows the Scottish Government to deal with the fact that the timing of the 
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collection of its devolved revenues and its spending commitments within a year may 
differ); 
x There is an annual limit of £300 million on borrowing to account for errors in forecasts of 
devolved taxes or welfare spending, and error in the forecasting of the BGAs; 
x There is an annual limit of £600 million on borrowing to address any observed or forecast 
shortfall in revenues or welfare expenditure where there is, or is forecast to be, a 
Scotland-specific economic shock (although there is scope to increase this limit, subject 
to agreement between the Scottish and UK Governments). The Fiscal Framework 
defines such a shock as periods when (on a rolling 4-TXDUWHUEDVLV6FRWODQG¶V*'3
grows (or is forecast to grow) by less than 1% and is also more than 1 percentage point 
less than growth in UK GDP growth.  
The Fiscal Framework also makes provisions for a cash reserve ± the Scotland Reserve ±which 
can be used to smooth spending and manage tax revenue volatility. The Scottish Government 
will be able to pay into reserves up to a total of £700 million and draw these down at a rate of up 
to £250 million a year for resource spending, and £100 million a year for capital spending. 
XI Capital borrowing 
The Fiscal Framework also specifies that the Scottish Government will now be able to borrow up 
to £450m annually for capital expenditure (the previous limit was £300m), within an overall 
statutory cap of £3bn. The Scottish Government may borrow through the UK Government from 
the National Loans Fund, by way of commercial loan, or through the issue of bonds. 
XII Administration and set-up costs 
The Scottish and UK governments are incurring costs in implementing and then managing the 
financial powers in the Scotland Acts. The revised fiscal framework sets out how the Scottish and 
UK governments will share the cost of implementing these powers. 
The UK Government will make a one-off payment of £200 million to the Scottish budget as a 
contribution towards costs, and transfer up to £66 million each year to the Scottish budget to 
cover ongoing administration costs. 
The Scottish Government is responsible for meeting HM5&¶VFRVWVLQVHWWLQJXSDQGRSHUDWLQJ
the income tax powers. The lifetime estimate of these costs is now forecast to be around £20-
25m, in addition to which there are likely to be annual implementation costs. 
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The Scottish Government is responsible for meeting all costs associated with establishing the 
Scottish Fiscal Commission (SFC), setting up the devolved taxes, and all administration and 
programme costs it incurs in creating new social security benefits or making discretionary 
payments. 
According to Audit Scotland8, by the end of 2015/16, the Scottish Government had spent £18.5 
million on programmes to implement the financial powers in the Scotland Acts. Most of this was 
to cover HMRC's costs in setting up and operating the Scottish rate of income tax. The Scottish 
Government budgeted a further £18 million for 2016/17 and £92 million for 2017/18. 
The Scottish Government expects that implementation will cost more than the £200 million than 
the UK Government will transfer to the Scottish budget, although it has not identified how much 
more. 
XIII Fiscal Framework implementation issues 
The transfer of revenue and social security responsibilities to the Scottish Government poses a 
number of technically difficult administrative challenges. Here we consider three of the main 
ones, relating to social security, VAT revenue estimation, and identification of Scottish income 
taxpayers. 
Perhaps the biggest challenge will be to transfer the social security benefits in a way that 
ensures that no Scottish recipients lose access to benefit payments, or see their payments 
GHOD\HG7KHILHQGLVKFRPSOH[LW\RIXQWDQJOLQJWKH6FRWWLVKHOHPHQWVWKH':3¶VGDWDEDVHV
should not be underestimated. Indeed the Scottish Government has noted that9µtransferring the 
devolved benefits safely presents a challenge on a scale unlike anything the Scottish 
Government has faced since devolution >LHWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIWKHSDUOLDPHQWLQ@¶ 
Assignment of VAT to the Scottish budget will begin in 2019/20. Assigned VAT will form a 
significant part of the Scottish budget, so it is essential that estimates of VAT raised in Scotland 
are robust and reliable. But how will Scottish VAT revenues be estimated? The estimation will 
likely involve large scale surveys of household spending in Scotland (from which estimates of 
VAT revenues can be derived), combined with expenditure surveys of visitors to Scotland. As 
with any survey-based approach, the estimates will be subject to a degree of error. And the 
calculations will be complex, given the significant range of products and services that are subject 
to reduced rates, zero-rates and exemptions (including financial services). A VAT-assignment 
                                                          
8
 http://www.audit-scotland.gov.uk/uploads/docs/report/2017/nr_170323_managing_financial_powers.pdf  
9
 http://www.gov.scot/Publications/2017/04/9266 (Para 89) 
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working group has been established to consider these issues, and is expected to release its first 
report later in 2017. 
Working out Scottish income tax revenues requires a clear and up-to-date assessment of who is 
Dµ6FRWWLVK¶LQFRPHWD[SD\HUDQGZKRLVQRW+05&KDVXndertaken significant work to identify 
Scottish income taxpayers for 2017/18. But this is not a one-off task. Each year, as people 
relocate between Scotland and rUK (or between Scotland and overseas), records will need to be 
kept up to date. This in part relies on taxpayers maintaining their up-to-date address details with 
HMRC. 
XIV Changes to the Scottish budget process 
The Scottish budget is clearly becoming more complex and is exposed to greater risk. As we 
have seen, it will involve revenues and block grant adjustments, forecasts and reconciliations, 
borrowing and cash management, and so on. 
This additional complexity will require changes to the way in which the Scottish Government 
presents its budgets, and the information and data it includes. It will require greater awareness of 
the medium term budgetary risks and opportunities facing the Scottish budget. And it will require 
changes to the way in which parliament scrutinises Scottish budgets and associated 
documentation. 
Recognising this, a Budget Review Group was set up by the Cabinet Secretary for Finance 
Derek MacKay MSP and the Convenor of the Finance Committee Bruce Crawford MSP to 
FRQVLGHUKRZWKH6FRWWLVKEXGJHWSURFHVVVKRXOGHYROYHLQOLJKWRIWKHSDUOLDPHQW¶VQHZILVFDO
powers. 
The Group is due to issue its report in July 2017. The report will set out how the vast amount of 
budgetary data should be presented in future budgets, and is expected to recommend that the 
SDUOLDPHQWDGRSWVDPRUHµ\HDUURXQG¶DSSURDFKWRVFUXWLQLVLQJWKLVLQIRUPDWLRQ 
XV Conclusions 
6FRWODQG¶VQHZILVFDOSRZHUVEULQJVXEVWDQWLDORSSRUWXQLWLHVWRWKH6FRWWLVK3DUOLDPHQW7KHVH
range from the possibility of radical reform ± for example in the way that land and property are 
taxed, or in the way in which disability is assessed in the social security system ± to the scope for 
PRUHPLQRUWZHDNVVXFKDVWKH6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQW¶VGHFLVLRQLQWRVHWDVRPHZKDW
lower threshold at which income taxpayers become liable for the Higher Rate of tax).  
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One of the big challenges that the new powers pose is the substantial uncertainty that exists 
around how some types of tax (or social security) changes might influence behaviours, and thus 
affect revenues or expenditure. 
But even if the Scottish Government chooses not to vary tax policy in Scotland, the way that the 
Fiscal Framework is designed means that the new fiscal powers are likely to affect the size of the 
Scottish budget. The growth of Scottish revenues per capita must match the growth of equivalent 
rUK revenues per capita if the Scottish budget is to be at least as well off as it would have been 
without tax devolution. 
This structure is intended to incentivise the Scottish Government to implement policies that will 
grow the Scottish economy and tax base. But the nature of this set-up comes with risks. The 
relative growth of Scottish revenues will be determined by many things that are outwith direct 
control or influence of the Scottish Government.  This ranges from global developments in the 
offshore oil and gas sector, to a booming housing market in London and the southeast of 
England, to the long-term effects of policies administered by previous devolved administrations. 
The new Fiscal Framework arrangements also introduce a range of complexities into the budget 
process. A large number of factors will determine the resources available to the Scottish 
Government, including not only the Scottish revenues but also the BGAs, the repayment 
implications of previous borrowing, the position of the Scotland reserve, and so on. And there will 
be a corresponding expansion in the number of organisations with some role to play in the 
implementation and delivery of the devolved powers, including forecasting organisations like the 
SFC and OBR, tax collection agency Revenue Scotland, and the new Social Security Agency. 
There is still some way to go before some of the fiscal powers are ready for implementation. This 
is particularly the case for VAT and the social security powers. Effective inter-governmental and 
cross agency working will be crucial to enable a smooth implementation. 
The increased level of media and public interest in the Scottish budget and Scottish fiscal policy 
in the past couple of years suggests that one of the supposed benefits of fiscal devolution 
(greater scrutiny and accountability for budgetary decisions) has already been realised. However, 
LWLVOLNHO\WREHVRPHWLPHXQWLOZHKDYHDFOHDUHUSLFWXUHDERXWZKHWKHUWKH6FRWWLVK3DUOLDPHQW¶V
additional fiscal responsibilities have led to better policy outcomes in Scotland. 
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Carbon emissions and the economic impact of healthy 
eating in Scotland 
David Comerford, Fraser of Allander Institute, University of Strathclyde 
 
Abstract 
This article uses on-going research at the Fraser of Allander Institute that explores the possibility 
RIDSROLF\³WULSOHZLQ´LQWKHDUHDRIKHDOWK\HDWLQJ,WVKRZVWKDWZHUHIRRGFRQVXPSWLRQLQ
Scotland to follow healthy eating guidelines, it would not only improve the health of the 
population, but also have positive environmental impacts and may even be associated with 
positive economic impacts as well. We demonstrate that were healthy eating in Scotland to 
become more prevalent it would impact positively on several stated Scottish Government policy 
objectives in health, environment and the economy.  
 Introduction and background 
It is well known that red meat is a particularly inefficient and carbon intensive way of generating 
calories for human consumption. For each calorie of meat produced, many calories of grain and 
other vegetable crops have to be grown to feed livestock. To the extent that arable farming has a 
certain emissions consequence per human calorie supplied, livestock production clearly 
multiplies these emissions per calorie produced.  And, this is before we take into consideration 
the methane produced by livestock, which further adds to climate change emissions. 
So, red meat consumption matters for climate change. It also matters for health, with high red 
meat diets associated with increased incidence of type II diabetes, heart disease and certain 
kinds of cancer. This immediately suggests the prospect of a policy win-win: if, somehow, we can 
eat in accordance with healthy eating guidelines (reducing calorie intake generally, but especially 
from red meat consumption) then not only will it help meet health policy outcomes, it may also 
reduce climate change emissions with consequential environmental benefit. 
In a study conducted by researchers at the Oxford Martin School, Springmann et al (2016) found 
WKDW³transitioning toward more plant-based diets that are in line with standard dietary guidelines 
could reduce global mortality by 6±10% and food-related greenhouse gas emissions by 29±70% 
compared with a reference scenario in 2050´6RVXFKDGLHWDU\VKLIWZRXOGKDYHSRVLWLYHKHDOWK
and environmental benefits, but what might be the economic impacts?  
Springmann et al (2016) do not consider the economic impact of such a dietary shift.  If demand 
for food, and especially red meat, falls then, in the absence of any increases in demand for other 
goods, GDP and employment are likely to fall too. As part of a project now underway at the 
Fraser of Allander Institute, we consider the climate change and macroeconomic impacts of such 
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a change in consumer demands toward a more healthy diet in Scotland on the Scottish 
environment and economy. 
7KH6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQWDLPVVHH6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQWWRFUHDWH³a more successful 
country, with opportunities for all of Scotland to flourish, through increasing sustainable economic 
growth´7KLVLVXQGHUSLQQHGE\WKHUHFHQWO\UHOHDVHG&OLPDWH&KDQJH3ODQFXUUHQWO\XQGHU
consultation, see Scottish Government, 2017), which recognises the role of agriculture in 
emissions and noted the possible economic benefits of a reduction in emissions from agriculture. 
To what extent can a shift in consumer demand for food and red meat contribute to achieving 
these policy objectives? 
1. Red meat and the food industry in the Scottish economy 
Table 1: SIC industries that constitute the Food & Drink sector in Scotland 
  
GVA 
(£m) %Scot 
Employment 
(no. of 
employees) %Scot 
Exports 
(£m) %Scot 
Other Final 
Demand 
(£m) %Scot 
Agriculture 1,142 0.9% 39,778 1.8% 889 1.4% 931 0.9% 
Fishing 74 0.1% 3,410 0.2% 157 0.2% 6 0.0% 
Aquaculture 120 0.1% 4,049 0.2% 337 0.5% 4 0.0% 
Meat processing 201 0.2% 5,743 0.3% 864 1.3% 230 0.2% 
Fish & fruit 
processing 
305 0.2% 7,361 0.3% 938 1.4% 241 0.2% 
Dairy products, oils 
& fats processing 
130 0.1% 2,670 0.1% 346 0.5% 237 0.2% 
Grain milling & 
starch 
19 0.0% 251 0.0% 63 0.1% 8 0.0% 
Bakery & 
farinaceous 
408 0.3% 10,928 0.5% 704 1.1% 290 0.3% 
Other food 214 0.2% 4,829 0.2% 397 0.6% 124 0.1% 
Animal feeds 55 0.0% 975 0.0% 134 0.2% 26 0.0% 
Spirits & wines 2,205 1.8% 9,335 0.4% 3,628 5.6% 179 0.2% 
Beer & malt 107 0.1% 1,178 0.1% 141 0.2% 41 0.0% 
Soft Drinks 170 0.1% 2,038 0.1% 321 0.5% 77 0.1% 
Total 5,149 4.2% 92,544 4.2% 8,919 13.8% 2,393 2.3% 
Source: Scottish Government (2016) 
6FRWODQG
V(FRQRPLF6WUDWHJ\VHH6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQWLGHQWLILHVµNH\VHFWRUV¶ZKHUH
6FRWODQGKDVDGLVWLQFWFRPSDUDWLYHDGYDQWDJHC)RRG	'ULQN¶LVRQHRIWKHP,QWHUPVRI
standard industrial classifications (SIC), the Food and Drink sector includes : Agriculture; Fishing; 
Aquaculture; Meat Processing; Fish & fruit Processing; Dairy Products, Oils & Fats Processing; 
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Grain Milling & Starch; Bakery & Farinaceous; Other Food; Animal Feeds; Spirits & Wines; Beer 
& Malt; and, Soft Drinks (refer Table 1). Using 2013 data (see Scottish Government, 2016), the 
Food and Drink sector generates 4.2% of Scottish Gross Value Added (GVA) and employment, 
13.8% of exports (defined as exports both to the rest of the UK and international destinations), 
and supplies 2.3% of Scottish final demand. 
The Scottish Government produces economic accounts, known as Input-Output (IO) tables, that 
describe the structure of production and the components of final demand in the Scottish 
economy, at a highly disaggregated level. The Scottish economy is disaggregated into 98 
different industrial sectors, including the 13 industrial sectors that comprise Food & Drink. The full 
IO tables show, in columns, what firms in each sector buy from all other sectors and what they 
import for use in production, plus the wages, profits and taxes that these firms pay. Across rows, 
the IO tables show what firms in each of sector sell to all other sectors for use in production, and 
also what they sell to households, governments, and what they export. The interconnectedness 
of the Scottish economy, and the input/output relationships between different industrial sectors 
and their contribution to final demand within the Scottish economy is thus shown in these Input / 
Output (IO) economic accounts. 
The Scottish IO tables shows that there are strong links between the industries which make up 
the Scottish Food & Drink sector.  For example, Meat Processing purchases inputs from 
Agriculture (e.g. meat), which in turn purchases inputs from Animal Feeds, which in turn 
purchases inputs from Agriculture (plant foods). But there are also links between the industries 
that constitute the Food & Drink sector and the wider economy.  For example, Food and Drink 
industries use the haulage industry to transport their output to final markets and destinations. 
Hence, this means that any reduction in consumer expenditure on the output of one industry ± 
such as Meat Processing - will have spillover effects on the levels of activity in other industries, 
especially (but not limited to) the other industries of the Food & Drink sector (e.g. in transport). 
Given the differential carbon intensity of red meat consumption as compared to the consumption 
of other foods, it would be useful to be able to disaggregate the agriculture sector in the IO table 
LQWR³UHGPHDW´DQG³RWKHUDJULFXOWXUH´VXE-sectors. Fortunately, Moxey (2016) has done much of 
WKHZRUNWRGRWKLVLQDUHSRUWIRU4XDOLW\0HDW6FRWODQG7KLVUHVHDUFKXVHV0R[H\¶V
disaggregation of the Agriculture sector, to help allocate food and drink carbon emissions to red 
meat consumption and to other food and drink consumption.  
2. Carbon emissions 
Carbon emissions at a national level can be considered using two alternative perspectives:  
production-oriented territorial emissions and the consumption-oriented carbon footprint. 
Territorial emissions are those actually produced within a territory and therefore include the 
emissions generated from the production of goods which will be exported and consumed outside 
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a territory. The carbon footprint conversely seeks to measure the emissions associated with the 
production of all goods consumed by the residents of a territory, wherever in the world they are 
actually emitted. All goods and services imported into Scotland for consumption by Scottish 
residents will have emissions associated with their production which appear in the territorial 
emissions of another country ± the carbon footprint metric allocates these emissions to Scotland; 
while all goods and services produced in Scotland but exported for consumption by the residents 
other countries will have emissions associated with their production which appear in Scottish 
territorial emissions ± the carbon footprint metric does not allocate these emissions to Scotland. 
6FRWODQG¶VHVWLPDWHGFDUERQIRotprint, at 95MtCO2e (Scottish Government, 2017b), is much 
higher (almost twice as high) than its territorial emissions of 51MtCO2e (National Atmospheric 
Emissions Inventory, 2016). This reflects the facts both that Scotland imports more than it 
exports (where exports and imports are both to/from the rest of the UK and to/from international 
destinations), and that its imports are much more carbon intensive than its exports, as is normally 
the case for an advanced, service sector dominated economy, like Scotland. 
Table 2: 6FRWODQG¶V7HUULWRULDO&DUERQ(PLVVLRQVDQG&DUERQ)RRWSULQW 
 
Values (£m) Emissions (MtCO2e)  
Production 232,964 47.1  
International Transport  2.3  
Land Use Changes  1.7  
Gross Output 
232,964 51.1 
Territorial 
Emissions 
rUK Intermediate Imports 28,476 8.6  
International Intermediate 
Imports 
16,588 28.9  
Less Total Intermediates (105,987)   
Total Final Goods 172,042 88.6  
Exports (67,931) (20.8)  
rUK Final Good Imports 19,707 5.3  
International Final Good 
Imports 
13,172 22.3  
National Income 136,991 95.4 Carbon Footprint 
 
7DEOHVKRZVKRZZHFDQUHFRQFLOH6FRWODQG¶VWHUULWRULDOHPLVVLRQVZLWKLWVFDUERQIRRWSULQW
XQGHUWKHDVVXPSWLRQWKDW6FRWODQG¶VH[SRUWVDUHDVFDUERQLQWHQVLYHDVLWVFRQVXPSWLRQIURP
domestic production, and assuming that economic activity in the rest of the UK is as carbon 
intensive as it is in Scotland. Productive economic activity in Scotland takes place and (in 
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combination with international aviation and shipping emissions and emissions from land use 
FKDQJHVLVDVVRFLDWHGZLWK6FRWODQG¶VWHUULWRULal emissions of 51MtCO2e. This activity relies on 
imported intermediate goods which also have caused emissions in their production outwith 
Scotland, and these emissions must be added as being associated with Scottish production. 
However, not all Scottish production is consumed by Scottish consumers, and so we can 
VXEWUDFWWKHHPLVVLRQVDVVRFLDWHGZLWK6FRWODQG¶VH[SRUWV&RQYHUVHO\ZHPXVWDGGWKH
emissions associated with final goods imports into Scotland in order to reach the Carbon 
Footprint total of 95MtCO2e. 
The territorial emissions, and the emissions associated with imported intermediate goods and 
services, can then be allocated to economic activity in specific sectors, while emissions 
associated with final goods imports can be associated with consumer demand for specific goods. 
3. Scenarios and results: environmental and economic impacts of healthy food 
consumption 
In this section we are interested in the impact of a change in consumer expenditures on Food & 
Drink, in line with healthy eating guidelines, on economic activity and carbon emissions in 
Scotland. We model this using the Input-Output framework, and as described below, we create 
two scenarios that represent the extremes of what households can do with the money that they 
now do not spend on food and drink: that is they either entirely save this money or they entirely 
spend it on other goods and services. Both scenarios, however, feature the same reduced 
expenditure on the output of the Food & Drink sector. 
We use the healthy eating guidelines described in Springmann et al (2016) which approximate to 
a 39% reduction in calories from red meat, and a 3% reduction in calories from other foods and 
drinks. Assuming that there is a one to one correspondence between expenditure and calories, 
the healthy eating scenario is assumed to be a 39% reduction in household expenditure on the 
output from the Red Meat and Meat Processing industries, and a 3% reduction in household 
expenditure upon the output of all the other Food & Drink sector industries. 
The two scenarios differ in terms of what these consumers are assumed do with the money they 
have saved from their reduction in food and drink expenditures. In the first scenario, household 
expenditure on food and drink is reduced as described and nothing else changes (i.e. the money 
is saved). The second scenario assumes that household expenditure in total is unaltered, and 
the reduction in food expenditure is compensated by an increase in expenditure across all other 
discretionary goods (in proportion to current hoXVHKROGV¶H[SHQGLWXUHRQWKHVHLWHPV± this turns 
out to require a 0.5% increase in such expenditure). Discretionary goods are identified as all 
those goods in the economy other than public services, accommodation costs and legal and 
financial services (i.e. the assumption is that, just because food expenditure has gone down, this 
does not mean that, for example, rent or insurance costs have gone up, or that the government 
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starts taxing households more in order to fund and spend more on public services). Both of these 
scenarios are modelled using an Input-Output framework as previously described. 
Table 3:  Scenario results 
Households 
GVA 
(£m)              % 
Employment 
QRH¶HHV 
Incomes 
(£m)              % Emissions Territorial (ktcO2e/%)    Footprint 
Save the money 
-103 -0.1% -3076 -0.1% -51 -0.1%  -1.0% -338 -0.9% 
Spend it on 
other goods 
-7 0.0% -899 0.0% +5 0.0% -479 -0.9% -218 -0.7% 
 
In the first scenario, households save all the money that they no longer spend on food and drink, 
and this leads to a reduction in GDP and employment associated with the food sectors, and in 
the sectors which supply inputs to the food sectors. Looking at the whole economy, GDP falls by 
0.1%, employment falls by 0.1% (around 3,000 FTE jobs), and carbon emissions generated 
within the Scottish economy fall by 1.0% (around 0.5MtCO2e). Exports are assumed to be 
unchanged, but various sectors of the Scottish economy now have reduced import demand 
(because of the reduced economic activity) and consumers have reduced their expenditure on 
IRRGLPSRUWV7KHFRPELQDWLRQRIWKHVHWZRHIIHFWVLPSURYHV6FRWODQG¶VWUDGH balance by £145m, 
and reduces the emissions generated outwith Scotland, but on behalf of Scottish residents, by 
0.3MtCO2e. The combination of reduced emissions within and outwith Scotland is to reduce 
6FRWODQG¶VFDUERQIRRWSULQWE\ 
Figure 1: Changes in GVA & Employment in Scenario 1 for 13 sectors with biggest absolute GVA 
changes 
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In the second scenario, the unchanged total household expenditure is reallocated away from 
food and drink, and results in approximately unchanged GDP, employment and trade balance (all 
changes are ±0.0% to this level of accuracy). Carbon emissions generated within the Scottish 
economy fall by 0.9% (around 0.5MtCO2e), and emissions generated outwith Scotland but on 
behalf of Scottish consumers are reduced by 0.2MtCO2e. ScoWODQG¶VFDUERQIRRWSULQWIDOOVE\
0.7%. 
Figure 2: Changes in GVA & Employment in Scenario 2 for 13 sectors with biggest absolute 
GVA changes 
 
 
As can be seen in Figure 2, households substitute their spending away from food and drink 
towards other sectors, and as a result we see large gains in activity and employment in Retail 
especially. This additional economic activity is associated with increased carbon emissions from 
these sectors. But the result of this shift in aggregate demand is that value added (wages and 
profits) and employment are largely unchanged ± they just move sectors; but total carbon 
emissions fall, because activity has moved from high emission sectors (red meat production etc.) 
to lower emission sectors (e.g. retail). 
4. Conclusions 
The results of the second scenario shows that the potential exists in Scotland  to  shift consumer 
spending away from food and drink, and especially away from red meat, in line with healthy 
eating guidelines, and to reduce carbon emissions without harming Scotland¶VRYHUDOOHFRQRPLF
performance. This result is before taking into account the economic benefits arising from the 
health impacts that we would expect to see from such a change, such as reduced healthcare 
costs and improved workforce productivity. Such a conclusion is clearly of interest to 
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SROLF\PDNHUVDVLWDOLJQVZHOOZLWKWKH6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQW¶VDLPVWRFUHDWH³DPRUHVXFFHVVIXO
country, with opportunities for all of Scotland to flourish, through increasing sustainable economic 
JURZWK´ 
Across the two extreme scenarios considered, the carbon emission benefits are clear. The 
difference between the economic impacts across the two scenarios highlights that the final 
economic impact of spending decisions depends not only upon the level of spending, but also 
upon to where this spending is directed. When we consider that the (unanalysed) health impact 
LVDOVROLNHO\WREHSRVLWLYHWKLVDQDO\VLVVXJJHVWVWKDWDSROLF\³WULSOHZLQ´WRLPSURYHHFRQRPLF
health and environmental outcomes is possible. 
However, it should be noted that in our analysis we have assumed and imposed a simple change 
in household spending patterns; however, as big a policy question is why would households 
make such a change? Government could, in principle, persuade households via healthy eating 
advertising, but the success of such a policy is highly uncertain. In future developments to this 
work we will look at other policy options, such as taxing red meat.  This would cause price 
changes that mean that consumers may respond by reducing their consumption in line with 
healthy eating guidelines. Such an analysis not only describes a policy which may well have 
more certain effects, but it also provides for another margin for this policy impact positively: the 
tax revenues could perhaps be recycled into increased public spending, or used to reduce other 
taxes, both of which may provide economic stimulus. 
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6FRWODQG¶VJHQGer pay gap; latest data and insights 
Neil Hamilton and Kenny Richmond, Scottish Enterprise1 
Abstract 
Women working full-WLPHLQ6FRWODQGHDUQOHVVRQDYHUDJHWKDQPHQ6FRWODQG¶VJHQGHUSD\JDS
at 6.2% in 2016 is smaller than the UK average and is generally declining. However, key sectors 
and occupations continue to post substantial pay gaps.  Occupational segregation, across 
VHFWRUVLVDPDMRUIDFWRULQH[SODLQLQJ6FRWODQG¶VJHQGHUSD\JDSEXWWKHXQGHUO\LQJFDXVHVDUH
the career disruptions of female workers plus some combination of other harder to measure 
factors such as discrimination and gender bias.  The potential economic benefits from closing 
6FRWODQG¶VJHQGHUSD\JDSDUHVXEVWDQWLDODPRUHHQJDJHGLQFOXVLYHDQGSURGXFWLYHZRUNIRUFH
an increase in consumer spending and an easing of skills shortages.  
1. Introduction 
Everyone has a right to participate in, and benefit from, economic opportunities equally. Gender 
pay differences are a measure of how well an economy is succeeding at delivering inclusive 
growth to its citizens. Inclusion is an important driver of economic performance, and a range of 
evidence highlights that economies that are more inclusive are more productive and grow faster2. 
Like nearly all other developed economies, Scotland has a gender pay gap with women who 
work full-time earning on average less than men.  This is despite UK legislation (the Equalities 
Act 2010) that gives women (and men) a right to equal pay for equal work3$OWKRXJK6FRWODQG¶V
gender pay gap is below the UK average and is generally declining, there are some sectors and 
occupations where the pay gap is substantial and rising, negatively affecting productive potential. 
This paper reviews the latest data and HYLGHQFHRQ6FRWODQG¶VJHQGHUSD\JDSDQGFRQVLGHUVLWV
underlying causes. It then explores the potential economic benefits of reducing the gender pay 
gap, and considers appropriate policy responses.  
There are many different ways to measure and present the pay gap4. In this analysis, we mirror 
the approach of the Scottish Government and use the full-time employment median pay gap 
                                                          
1
 Scottish Enterprise is Scotland's main economic development agency. 
2
 See for example The Productivity-Inclusiveness Nexus, OECD 2016 and Redistribution, Inequality and Growth IMF Staff 
Discussion Note, IMF 2014 
3
 Equalities Act 2010. The provisions of the Equality Act relating to equal pay set out that an individual can claim equal pay when 
she or he, when compared with a comparator of the opposite sex, is employed in: 
x Like work:  work that is the same or broadly similar, regardless of whether the job title is the same. 
x Work rated as equivalent:  work that has been rated as equivalent under a job evaluation scheme. 
x Work of equal value:  work that requires the same levels of effort, skill, knowledge and responsibility. 
4
 For a full discXVVLRQRQWKHFRPSOH[LWLHVRIPHDVXULQJDQGUHSRUWLQJRQ6FRWODQG¶VSD\JDSVHHClose the Gap Working Paper 
17: Gender Pay Gap Statistics 
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measure, which allows a direct comparison of earnings between women and men working full-
time only and removes the effect of differences in working patterns5.  
:K\6FRWODQG¶VJHQGHUSD\JDSPDWWHUV 
Traditionally, gender pay differences have been considered primarily as an issue of equality. This 
has fundamentally shifted over the past few years and there is now a growing policy recognition 
that pay parity is not simply an issue of fairness but also one of economic efficiency. Gender pay 
GLIIHUHQFHVUHSUHVHQWWKHXQWDSSHGSRWHQWLDORIZRPHQ¶VWDOHQWVDQGVNLOOV7KHJHQGHUSD\JDS
represents a productivity as well as fairness gap, and there are real economic gains to be made 
from closing it6. 
6FRWODQG¶V(FRQRPLF6WUDWHJ\6(6UHFRJQLVHVWKDWPD[LPLVLQJHFRQRPLFRSSRUWXQLWLHVIRU
women to participate fully in the economy is key to improving economic performance and tackling 
inequality. SES highlights that supporting women to overcome the barriers and structural 
challenges they face in the labour market is good for women and families, good for business and 
good for the Scottish economy7. The full-time employment gender pay gap is a National 
Performance Framework indicator monitored by the Scottish Government8. 
3. Latest data and trends 
The Office of National Statistics (ONS) calculates the gender pay gap as the difference between 
the median full-time hourly earnings (excluding overtime) of men and women as a proportion of 
the median full-time hourly earnings of men. A positive pay gap indicates that men are earning 
more than women; a negative pay gap means that women are earning more than men. 
,Q6FRWODQG¶VSD\JDSZDVSHUFHnt. Men working full-time earned an average of £13.85 
per hour compared to an average of £13.00 for women.  
2YHUWKHSDVWWZRGHFDGHV6FRWODQG¶VSD\JDSKDVIDOOHQIURPDKLJKRISHUFHQWLQWR
6.2 percent.  The narrowing gap is mainly due to female wages rising faster than that of males. 
7KLVKDVEHHQGULYHQE\WKHORQJHUWHUPWUHQGRIZRPHQµVHGXFDWLRQDOTXDOLILFDWLRQV
increasing more quickly WKDQPHQ¶VKLJKHUTXDOLILFDWLRQOHYHOVDUHDVVRFLDWHGZLWKKLJKHUSD\
and recent rises to the minimum wage that have disproportionately benefited women9.  
                                                          
5
 However, we recognise that a focus on full-time earnings excludes a large proportion of women in the workforce. Though women 
represent 52 percent of the Scottish workforce, only 57 percent of female workers are in full-time employment. Excluding almost 
half the women in the labour market from these pay gap calculations ignores the many challenges and constraints faced by 
women who work part-time. 
6
 The UK Commission for Employment & Skills points to research estimating the under-XWLOLVDWLRQRIZRPHQ¶VVNLOOVFRVWVWKH8.
economy between 1.3 percent and 2 percent of GDP every year 
7
 6FRWODQG¶V(FRQRPLF6WUDWHJ\, Scottish Government, 2015 
8
 Scotland Performs, Scottish Government 
9
 Sectors ZLWKWKHPRVWµPLQLPXPZDJHMREV¶DUHKRVSLWDOLW\VRFLDOFDUHFOHDQLQJDQGHPSOR\PHQWDJHQFLHVDQGWKHVHKDYH
high proportions of female workers. 
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Figure 1: Gender pay gap (%), Scotland, 1997-2016 
 
Source: Annual Survey of Hours & Earnings, Office for National Statistics 
 
Figure 2: Gender pay gap, by UK nation, 2011-2016 
 
 
Source: Annual Survey of Hours & Earnings, Office for National Statistics 
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6FRWODQG¶VJHQGHUSD\JDSLVVPDOOHUWKDQWKH8.DYHUDJHDQGVPDOOHUWKDQDQ\RWKHU8.QDWLRQ
except Northern Ireland10. However, as of 2014, the UK had the 11th highest gender pay gap of 
2(&'FRXQWULHVVR6FRWODQG¶VJDSLVDOVROLNHO\WREHDERYHWKH2(&'DYHUDJH11. 
&DXVHVRI6FRWODQG¶VJHQGHUSD\JDS 
There are a range of causes of the gender pay gap. Discrimination, unconscious gender bias 
(assumptions aboXWZRPHQ¶VVNLOOVDQGSUHIHUHQFHVWKHXQGHUYDOXLQJRIIHPDOH-dominated work 
and stereotyping may all be factors, although there are no specific Scottish data or research on 
these12. 
7ZRSRWHQWLDOFDXVHVRI6FRWODQG¶VJHQGHUSD\JDSZKHUHGDWDLVDYDLODEOH are presented below. 
i. Career disruptions of female workers 
A common reason for gender pay gaps worldwide is the disproportionate career disruptions that 
many female workers bear in order to take on caring responsibilities, most often raising children 
and increasingly looking after elderly parents / family members. This is often because women are 
stereotypically believed to be better at caring-type work. 
In Scotland, a widening pay gap in older age groups lends support to this. Figure 3 shows that in 
Scotland the pay gap was close to zero for the 25 to 34 age group in 2016, but widened for older 
age groups (the pay gap for the 16 to 24 year olds, which covers a period of education, has 
historically proven difficult to measure and understand13).   
The wider pay gap in latter-career age groups is largely consistent with women leaving the labour 
market temporarily and then re-entering at a lower salary than had they remained working, or 
indeed at a lower salary than men who continued working14. That is, spending time out of the 
workforce to care for their families is resulting in women missing out on pay progression. Similar 
trends can be seen across the world15. The pay gap is largest for women in the oldest age group, 
DQGWKLVLVOLNHO\WREHLQSDUWGXHWRWKHµJODVVFHLOLQJ¶HIIHFWWKDWVHHVIHZHUZRPHQUHDFKLQJ
senior management positions16. 
                                                          
10
 Northern Ireland is an interesting case where female average wages are actually higher than male average wages. Two 
possible reasons are the greater proportion of women who work in the public sector, which carries a significant wage premium 
compared to the private sector in Northern Ireland, and a lower overall female employment rate. 
11
 ,W LV QRW SRVVLEOH WR GLUHFWO\ FRPSDUH 6FRWODQG¶V SD\ JDS ZLWK OECD statistics due to different definitions used and data 
availability. 
12
 For an overview of causes at the UK level, see for example The Gender Pay Gap: Facts, Causes and Solutions, Fawcett 
Society 2016, and The Women and Equalities Committee, UK Parliament, 2016. 
13
 However, UNESCO data indicates UK women stay in education an average of 0.9 years longer than men, so it may also be 
the case they do not enter the labour market until later. 
14
 Women leaving the labor market is often a by-product of inflexible working practices that make it difficult to combine employment 
and caring responsibilities   
15
 See for example EU data 
16
 Gender Pay Gap report, Written evidence submitted by The Chartered Management Institute (CMI), UK Parliament, 2016. 
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Figure 3: Gender pay gap, by age cohort, Scotland, 2016 
 
 
Source: Annual Survey of Hours & Earnings, Office for National Statistics 
 
ii. Occupational segregation 
There is HYLGHQFHWKDW6FRWODQG¶VRYHUDOOSD\JDSLVDOVROLQNHGWRWKHRFFXSDWLRQDOFRPSRVLWLRQ
RIWKHFRXQWU\¶VZRUNIRUFH with full-time female workers disproportionately concentrated in lower 
paying occupations.  
Figure 4 shows the distribution of men and women DFURVV6FRWODQG¶VIXOO-time workforce. Women 
are over-represented in lower paid occupational groups such as caring and customer service 
occupations17.  
Although women are also well-represented in higher paid groups, this is predominantly because 
they hold more than two-WKLUGVRIDOOMREVFRQVLGHUHGµSURIHVVLRQDO¶LQWKHHGXFDWLRQDQG
healthcare sectors. This masks significant under-representation in other higher paying 
occupational groups, particularly managerial roles (where men hold 66 percent of all positions).  
Evidence of the dominance of one gender in certain jobs and occupations (often reflecting 
stereotypes about the skills and attributes associated with that gender18) along with men being 
more likely than women to be found in management, points to two distinct layers of occupational 
segregation in Scotland ± horizontal (where men and women are clustered in different kinds of 
                                                          
17
 See Appendix A for full clarification of the wage tiers used. 
18
 For example, men in skilled trades and women in caring occupations  
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roles), and vertical (where men and women cluster at different levels of seniority in the same 
kind of role)19. 
 Figure 4: Gender occupational distribution, by high, medium and low wage occupations (% of 
male and female full-time employment), Scotland, 2016 
 
Source: Annual Survey of Hours & Earnings, Office for National Statistics 
Gender pay gaps exist in all occupational groups in Scotland, illustrated in Figure 5 (and in more 
detail in Appendix B). The pay gaps are most pronounced in the skilled trades and in 
management occupations (gaps of 29.3 percent and 19.8 percent, respectively). Gender pay 
gaps persist even though women have a higher educational profile than men. 
A key individual contributor to the overall pay gap is professional occupations, which have a 
relatively small pay gap of 5.3 percent, a high proportion of employees who are women (49.9 
percent) and a large share of the total workforce (24.8 percent). Associate professional 
occupations, which represent a lower skill level than professional occupations, also stand out as 
a large occupational group with a relatively large pay gap. 
Although imperfect, there does appear to be a relationship between the gender parity of an 
occupational group and the extent of the gender pay gap in that group. That is, the more gender 
balanced an occupational group, the lower is its pay gap20.  
                                                          
19
 Of the two, vertical segregation is the more difficult to measure because it refers to hierarchies within individual occupations. 
20
 Male-dominated industries are generally less likely to have pay transparency, undertake equal pay reviews, and have good 
equalities practice.  
55.6%
19.8%
24.6%
51.1%
32.6%
16.2%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
High Wage Occupations Medium Wage Occupations Low Wage Occupations
Female
Male
Fraser of Allander Institute Economic Commentary, June 2017  
55 
 
Figure 5: Gender pay gap, by occupation and scale of occupation, Scotland, 2016 
 
Source: Annual Survey of Hours & Earnings, Office for National Statistics 
 
There has been a mixed performance in closing occupational pay gaps since 2011, the first year 
of the most recent and consistent time series data. While several occupational groups have 
recorded a decline in their pay gap over the period, there has been a notable lack of progress for 
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there is a high proportion of women workers ± both full time (as used in this analysis) and in part-
time employment.  
In fact, gender pay gaps exist in the overwhelming majority of sectors, as illustrated in Figure 7.  
The most pronounced pay gaps are in the financial & insurance and professional & scientific 
sectors (29.9 percent and 28.7 percent respectively) as well as the energy and manufacturing 
sectors (each 17.9 percent). Some public sector focused sectors, such as public administration 
and education, have lesser pay gaps (or even negative pay gaps), though health & social work 
still has a substantial pay gap (12.6 percent). 
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Figure 6: Gender pay gap, by occupation and percentage point change (ranked by 2016 pay 
gap), Scotland, 2011-2016 
Source: Annual Survey of Hours & Earnings, Office for National Statistics 
Figure 7: Gender pay gap, by industry (ranked by 2016 pay gap), Scotland 
 
Source: Annual Survey of Hours & Earnings, Office for National Statistics 
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(YLGHQFHVXJJHVWVWKDWLQGXVWU\SD\JDSVDUHODUJHO\GXHWRHDFKLQGXVWU\¶VRFFXSDWLRQDOPDNH-
up21. Within most industries, women tend to be in the lower paid occupations. For example, in 
financial services women account for 76 percent of lower paid administrative and secretarial 
occupations and 56 percent of sales and customer services occupations (both lower paid), and 
less than 40 percent of managerial and professional occupations (both higher paid).   
In summary, the evidence suggests that: 
x the causes of pay gaps within occupations are likely to be due to the career disruptions of 
female workers plus some combination of other harder to measure factors such as 
discrimination and gender bias; 
x it is a combination of women tending to be in lower paid occupations within each industry, 
plus women getting paid less than men within each occupation, that drives industry pay 
gaps;  
x WRDGGUHVV6FRWODQG¶VJHQGHUSD\JDSWZRWKLQJVQHHGWRKDSSHQ2QHPRUHZRPHQ
need to have the opportunity to be employed in higher paid occupations across all 
industries and, two,  pay gaps within individual occupations need to be addressed.  
3RWHQWLDOHFRQRPLFEHQHILWVRIUHGXFLQJ6FRWODQG¶VJHQGHUSD\JDS 
Though often viewed as an issue of equality or fairness, the reduction or even elimination of 
6FRWODQG¶VJHQGHUSD\JDSZRXOGGHOLYHUVLJQLILFDQWEHQHILWVWRWKH6FRWWLVK economy. These 
potential economic benefits can be considered in three key areas. 
i. Increased consumer spending 
$WDYHU\VLPSOHOHYHOUHGXFLQJRUHOLPLQDWLQJWKHJHQGHUSD\JDSE\UDLVLQJZRPHQ¶VSD\WRWKDW
of men would generate additional spending in the Scottish economy22. Fully closing the full-time 
gender pay gap in Scotland would increase total female earnings by an estimated £1.9 billion per 
year23, with women standing to gain up to £11,000 in earnings per year depending on the sector 
in which they work. 
 
                                                          
21
 It is not currently possible to examine levels of full-time male and female occupational employment within industries in Annual 
Survey of Household Earnings (ASHE) data. However, the Annual Population Survey, while not allowing for the same delineation 
of working patterns or industry detail, does provide a good proxy and is shown in Appendix C.      
22
 This assumes reducing the pay gap by increasing female incomes rather than decreasing male incomes 
23
 Based on full-time female workers receiving an hourly raise in each industry to bring earnings in line with men, and assuming 
a 35-hour workweek. Note - this is a highly conservative figure that only takes into consideration women currently employed 
full-time, so excludes part-WLPHZRUNHUV¶SD\JDSV 
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Figure 8: 3RWHQWLDOLQFUHDVHLQDQQXDOHDUQLQJVSHUZRPDQIURPHOLPLQDWLQJ6FRWODQG¶VJHQGHU
pay gap, 2016 
 
Source: Scottish Enterprise calculations; Annual Survey of Hours & Earnings, Office for National Statistics 
ii. Easing of skills shortages 
Gender pay differences may be reducing the supply of qualified female labour Scotland, 
contributing to recruitment challenges and skills gaps.  Closing the gender pay gap may lead to a 
more efficient labour market in two ways. 
 First, raising the pay of women across occupations may encourage more women to enter the 
labour market and/or work more, or reduce the likelihood of them leaving the labour market. 
0DQ\RI6FRWODQG¶VLQGXVWULHVUHJXODUO\UHSRUWGLIILFXOW\UHWDLQLQJVWDII24, and there is evidence that 
female employees who believe they are fairly paid would be less likely to quit their jobs25. 
Second, companies who show a commitment to gender pay equality will be able to better 
address skills shortages with qualified female talent26. The occupational groups with the highest 
                                                          
24
 Employer Skills Survey 2015, UKCES 
25
 3D\VFDOH¶V&RPSHQVDWLRQ%HVW3UDFWLFHV5HSRUW each year indicates that inadequate pay is the number one reason people 
leave an organisation 
26
 In a 2015 survey of 1,000 UK employees, when trying to decide between two employers, more than half of female 
respondents would favour the company with the smallest pay gap or the one that is more proactive in closing it 
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density of skill-shortage vacancies in Scotland (skilled trades and machine operatives27) are also 
the two most male-dominated and have high gender pay gaps. There is also evidence that a 
majority of women with science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) qualifications 
in Scotland do not go on to work in STEM areas28. Closing the gender pay gap can help 
companies that employ these occupations access all skills in the workforce29. 
iii. Enhanced employee engagement & diversity 
Levels of employee engagement in the UK, and by implication Scotland, are relatively low 
compared to other countries. In a 2015 survey of 20 countries, the UK ranked only 12th in terms 
of employee engagement, below the global average30. 
There is strong evidence employees who believe that they are fairly paid are more engaged31. It 
IROORZVWKHQWKDWFORVLQJ6FRWODQG¶VJHQGHUSD\JDSFRXOGUHVXOWLQDPRUHHQJDJHGZRUNIRUFH
Businesses with high employee engagement are more productive, more profitable, more 
innovative and have significantly lower employee turnover and absenteeism32.  
Reducing the pay gap may also improve gender diversity in some male-dominated sectors and 
companies, such as in manufacturing. There is a range of evidence that shows that a more 
gender balanced workforce is more innovative and productive33. 
6. Conclusions and policy implications   
7KLVSDSHUKDVKLJKOLJKWHGERWKWKHH[WHQWDQGQHJDWLYHFRQVHTXHQFHVRI6FRWODQG¶VJHQGHUSD\
gap and that wage inequality is a barrier to economic and inclusive growth in Scotland. However, 
it also highlights the potential productivity and economic growth benefits of closing the gender 
pay gap, as well as equality benefits. 
7KHHYLGHQFHKLJKOLJKWVWKDW6FRWODQG¶VRYHUDOOSD\JDSLVGULYHQE\DPL[RIWKH gender 
occupational make-up within sectors, and pay gaps within occupations caused by female career 
disruption and other harder to measure factors such as stereotyping and discrimination. The 
evidence also highlights that across many industries, women make up less than half of higher 
paying occupations.  
6FRWWLVK(QWHUSULVH6(KDVVXSSRUWHGHIIRUWVWRUHGXFH6FRWODQG¶VJHQGHUSD\JDS)RU
example, SE is a long-standing advisory group member of Close the Gap, a charity focused on 
                                                          
27
 Employer Skills Survey 2015, UKCES 
28
 Tapping All Our Talents, The Royal Society of Edinburgh, 2012 
29
 This assumes there are sufficient women in the labor market with the desired skills 
30
 Global Perspectives 2015, ORC International 
31
 World at Work, 2013 
32
 Gallup, 2016 
33
 See for example Women Matter, McKinsey and The Business Benefits of Gender Diversity, Gallup 2014 
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female participation in the Scottish labour market. In addition, SE extensively promotes the 
Scottish Business Pledge34, which helps to highlight the benefits of a balanced workforce, 
fairness and workforce engagement as well as adoption of the living wage. 
The evidence presented in this paper lends support to these initiatives, and also provides for the 
exploration of additional policies and approaches that would help minimise the impact of career 
disruption and support women returning to work. These may include improving access to 
affordable childcare, as well as stronger incentives to encourage adoption of shared parental 
leave. 
+RZHYHUWKLVSDSHUDOVRPDNHVFOHDUWKDWWKHXQGHUO\LQJFDXVHVRI6FRWODQG¶VJHQGHUSD\JDS
are such that an appropriate response must also involve industry.  
To address possible discrimination and gender bias, businesses can look to new UK gender pay 
reporting requirements35 as a potential incentive to ensure that all employees are paid fairly and 
developed equally. Promoting flexible working options is also a key opportunity for businesses to 
fully leverage the talent of its female employees, and this should be accompanied by a revised 
performance management framework that is free from gender bias and that focuses increasingly 
on results and outcomes and less on physical presence in the workplace.  
,QLWLDWLYHVVXFKDV6(¶VZRUNSODFHLQQRYDWLRQDQGRUJDQLVDWLRQDOGHYHORSPHQW programmes 
support companies to grow in a way that also helps close the gender pay gap and improve 
equality. Recent sector productivity plans for Food & Drink and Tourism have both included 
HTXDOLW\FRPSRQHQWVDQG6FRWODQG¶VODUJHILQDQFHVHFWRUZLWKWKHODUJHVWJHQGHUSD\JDSRIDQ\
industry in Scotland and a sizable female workforce) may be an important area of future focus.  
However, E\HVWDEOLVKLQJ6FRWODQG¶VJHQGHUSD\JDSDVSUHGRPLQDQWO\DQoccupational rather 
than simply a sectoral one, this paper also suggests that other approaches are necessary to 
tackling gender pay differences. The most impactful future interventions are likely to come from 
HIIRUWVWRGLYHUVLI\DQGDGYDQFHZRPHQ¶VUROHLQDOOZRUNSODFHVDFURVVDOORFFXSDWLRQV,PSURYHG
access to data surrounding the occupational distribution of women within industries will help build 
an appropriate evidence base by which policy interventions can be both measured and 
developed.  
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34
 https://scottishbusinesspledge.scot/  
35
 From 2017, UK businesses with 250 or more employees are required by law to report their pay gap 
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Appendix A: Occupational distribution by gender (% of male and female full-time employment), 
Scotland, 2016 
Source: Annual Survey of Hours & Earnings, Office for National Statistics 
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Appendix B: Gender pay gap by detailed occupation, Scotland, 2016 
      Female % of Employees 
Occupation Employment Employment Employment Who Are Pay 
(descending wage order) (000s) Share Share Female Gap 
Professional  393 24.8% 29.8% 49.9% 5.3% 
Science, research, engineering and 
technology  97 6.1% 2.9% 19.6% 11.0% 
Health  113 7.1% 12.3% 71.7% 17.2% 
Teaching and educational  93 5.9% 9.0% 63.4% 4.2% 
Business, media and public service 91 5.7% 5.6% 40.7% 2.2% 
Managers, directors & senior officials 181 11.4% 9.4% 34.3% 19.8% 
Corporate managers and directors 148 9.3% 7.0% 31.1% 19.7% 
Other managers and proprietors 34 2.1% 2.4% 47.1% 12.0% 
Associate professional & technical  265 16.7% 16.4% 40.8% 9.1% 
Science, engineering and technology  56 3.5% 1.8% 21.4% 6.6% 
Health and social care  26 1.6% 2.6% 65.4% 15.6% 
Protective service  42 2.7% 1.7% 26.2% -3.4% 
Culture, media and sports 11 0.7% 0.6% 36.4% 7.8% 
Business and public service  129 8.1% 9.6% 48.8% 12.2% 
Skilled trades  165 10.4% 1.5% 6.1% 29.3% 
Skilled agricultural  11 0.7% 0.2% 9.1% 8.9% 
Skilled metal, electrical and electronic  88 5.6% 0.2% 1.1% 7.9% 
Skilled construction and building 37 2.3% 0.0% 0.0% 21.4% 
Textiles, printing and other  28 1.8% 1.1% 25.0% 4.0% 
Administrative & secretarial  157 9.9% 16.6% 69.4% 9.1% 
Administrative  134 8.5% 13.5% 66.4% 7.3% 
Secretarial 23 1.5% 3.0% 87.0% 8.3% 
Process, plant & machine operatives 110 6.9% 1.7% 10.0% 15.7% 
Process, plant and machine operatives 50 3.2% 1.5% 20.0% 26.6% 
Transport and mobile machine drivers  60 3.8% 0.3% 3.3% -3.2% 
Caring, leisure & other service  109 6.9% 12.2% 73.4% 9.7% 
Caring personal service  85 5.4% 10.3% 80.0% 8.2% 
Leisure, travel and related personal 
service  24 1.5% 1.8% 50.0% 15.9% 
Sales & customer service  87 5.5% 7.1% 54.0% 6.3% 
Sales  51 3.2% 3.8% 49.0% 9.1% 
Customer service  37 2.3% 3.2% 56.8% 1.0% 
Elementary  116 7.3% 5.3% 30.2% 14.5% 
Elementary trades and related  29 1.8% 0.8% 17.2% 9.7% 
Elementary administration and service  87 5.5% 4.6% 34.5% 15.2% 
UK data used as proxy 
Source: Annual Survey of Hours & Earnings, Office for National Statistics 
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Appendix C: Female share of occupational employment by industry, Scotland, 2016 
 
 
Industry Prof 
Managers, 
directors 
& senior 
officials 
 
Associate 
prof 
Skilled 
trades  
 Admin & 
secretarial  
Process, 
plant & 
machine 
operatives 
 
Caring, 
leisure 
& other 
service  
Sales & 
customer 
service  
Elementary  
Agricuture & 
fishing 
N/A 22.0% N/A 8.5% 86.1% N/A N/A N/A 17.3% 
Energy & water 10.4% 15.8% 28.3% N/A 71.4% N/A N/A 51.6% 11.8% 
Manufacturing 20.2% 24.9% 30.6% 9.7% 71.7% 20.8% N/A 41.7% 28.3% 
Construction 10.8% 16.8% 27.2% 1.3% 91.5% N/A N/A N/A 5.6% 
Distribution, 
hotels & 
restaurants 
43.9% 40.2% 45.1% 22.4% 73.1% 15.5% 79.2% 68.6% 54.3% 
Transport & 
communication 
19.2% 32.5% 32.7% 8.2% 71.3% 3.7% 76.2% 77.7% 21.2% 
Banking finance 
& insurance 
35.3% 39.3% 45.3% 8.8% 76.2% 11.7% 63.5% 56.6% 46.8% 
Public 
admin,education 
& health 
70.6% 54.3% 54.0% 39.7% 82.2% 12.3% 84.3% 60.6% 63.3% 
Other services 40.8% 49.2% 48.1% 18.8% 74.7% N/A 72.2% 79.7% 55.9% 
N/A - data unavailable 
Source: Annual Population Survey, Office for National Statistics 
LOWER WAGE HIGHER WAGE 
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Self-employment in Scotland: trends and its implications 
for productivity 
Kenny Richmond and Jonathan Slow, Scottish Enterprise1 
Abstract  
Self-employment in Scotland has grown significantly in recent years, faster than in many other 
countries.  It has accounted for almost half of overall employment growth over the past decade 
and over 80% of the growth in the number of businesses in Scotland. Self-employment in 
Scotland, however, accounts for just over 1 in 10 jobs, lower than in many other countries. This 
paper outlines recent trends in the growth in self-employment in Scotland, summarises the likely 
reasons, highlights the characteristics of the self-employed and considers the implications for 
productivity and economic growth. It notes that productivity levels of self-employed businesses 
are significantly lower than larger businesses, as are earnings of the self-employed vis-à-vis 
employees. The fast growth in the number of low productivity, self-employed businesses in 
6FRWODQGPD\LQSDUWH[SODLQ6FRWODQG¶VRYHUDOOPHGLRFUHSURGXFWLYLW\SHUIRUPDQFH 
1. Introduction 
Self-employment has increased significantly over recent years in Scotland, and has contributed 
to almost half of total employment growth. This paper outlines recent trends in the growth in self-
employment, summarises the likely reasons, highlights the characteristics of the self-employed in 
Scotland and considers the implications for productivity and inclusive growth2. 
2. Trends in self-employment 
The number of people classified as self-employed in Scotland has risen from 242,500 in 2005 to 
304,400 in 20163 (+26%). The rate of growth, however, has been lower than in the UK as a 
whole (+29%). Self-employment in Scotland now accounts for 11.8% of all employment, again 
lower than the UK rate of 14.9%. Over the period 2005-2016, total employment in Scotland rose 
by 137,000 or 5.6%, with almost half of this (45%) accounted for by the growth in self-
employment. 
Compared to other countries, Scotland has a lower self-employment rate; however, it has one of 
the highest rates of growth in self-employment.4 
                                                          
1
 Scottish Enterprise is Scotland's main economic development agency 
2
 There is a large body of research on self-employment and this paper is not intended to be exhaustive overview or analysis.   
3
 Source: Annual Population Survey (for the 12 months to June each year) 
4
 2014 is the latest available data for OECD countries. 
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Figure 1: Percentage in employment who are self-employed, OECD countries, 2014 
 
Source: ONS, OECD 
 
 
Figure 2: Percentage change in number of self-employed, OECD, 2005-2014 
 
Source: ONS, OECD 
 
The growth in self-employment has boosted the number of businesses in Scotland over the past 
decade, with the total number rising by 30% from 270,250 to 350,410 (+80,160). Self-employed 
businesses accounted for 82% of this rise (+65,950).  
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Figure 3: Growth in the number of businesses in Scotland, index 2006 = 100 
 
Source: Scottish Government 
 
3. Reasons for the growth in self-employment in Scotland 
Self-employment can take a number of forms, including: 
x owning or running a business (which could be described µJHQXLQHHQWUHSUHQHXUVKLS¶5) 
x working for multiple businesses often via short term contracts (sometimes described as 
the freelance or µJLJHFRQRP\¶ 
x working for a single business as a self-employed contractor. 
Most self-employed people in the UK consider themselves as running a business (around 65%), 
with 20% doing freelance work and around 10% stating they are contractors6.  A similar pattern is 
likely for Scotland. 
:KDWLVWKHµJLJHFRQRP\¶" 
7KHµJLJHFRQRP\¶KDVUHFHLYHGDORWRIFRYHUDJHUHFHQWO\7KH:ork Foundation defines it as: 
³WKHHFRQRPLFVHFWRUFRQVLVWLQJRIIUHHODQFHZRUNHUVZKRVXUYLYHE\WDNLQJRQDVHULHVRIVPDOO
MREVSDUWLFXODUO\ZKHQWKRVHMREVDUHDUUDQJHGXVLQJDZHEVLWHRUDSS´7.  
                                                          
5
 For example see Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy µBusiness Population Estimates For The UK And 
5HJLRQV0HWKRGRORJ\1RWH3¶ and Self-employment, Small Firms and Enterprise, Institute of Economic Affairs,(2011)  
6
 Understanding self-employment, UK Government (2015)  
7
 µIn search of the gig economy¶Work Foundation (2016)  
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7KHJLJHFRQRP\FDQDOVREHGHILQHGDVµSRUWIROLRZRUNLQJ¶ZKHUHSHRSOHZRUNRQDQXPEHURI
different projects for different organisations, sometimes combining this with other more formal 
employment8.  
The gig economy includes workers across a range of skills levels, for example web and software 
designers (higher skilled); construction workers (medium skilled); and delivery/taxi drivers and 
personal services (lower skilled).   
Being self-employed can often be by choice (proactive); for example, identifying a market 
opportunity to provide goods/services; choosing to work as a contractor for another business due 
to the benefits of flexibility; or, as a way to supplement income.  
However, self-HPSOR\PHQWFDQDOVREHWKURXJKµQHFHVVLW\¶UHDFWLYHRULPSRVHGIRUH[DPSOHLI
WKHUHDUHQRRWKHUµVXLWDEOH¶employment opportunities available (in terms of job type or job 
flexibility), or if an employer changes its business model to outsource functions and re-hires 
former employees as self-employed contractors9.  
Data from ONS show that the proactive reasons for self-employment (e.g. identifying a market 
opportunity, moving to a chosen career or for better work conditions or job satisfaction) outweigh 
the reactive or imposed (e.g. redundancy or could not find other employment) across all age 
groups10.  
Similarly, UK Government research reported that 87% of people surveyed stated positive 
reasons as their motivation for becoming self-employed, with the most frequently cited reason 
being the freedom, flexibility and independence of being self-employed compared to working for 
someone else11.    
Research at the UK level ± and it is assumed to be the same for Scotland - shows that12: 
x self-employed workers are broadly content with their labour market status;  
x the main reported benefits of being self-employed are increased flexibility over working 
patterns, independence, and job satisfaction - the main motivations are opportunity-based, 
not financial 
x many expect to be in self-HPSOR\PHQWLQWKUHH\HDUV¶WLPH 
                                                          
8
 What does the gig economy mean for HR? Personnel Today  
9
 6HHµIndependent work: choice, necessity and the gig economy¶, (McKinsey) for a discussion 
10
 Trends in Self Employment in the UK: 2001-2015 ONS (2016) 
11
 See Self Employment Review  BIS (2016)  
12
 ONS (2016) µ7UHQGVLQVHOIHPSOR\PHQWLQWKH8.-¶ and ERC (2016) µ8QGHUVWDQGLQJVHOIHPSOR\PHQW± a report 
from a seminar held at Middlesex University Business ScKRRO¶ 
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x very few have any ambition to be employers or significantly increase the scale of their 
operations (86% of Scottish self-employed people in 2015 did not expect to recruit over the 
next year13); 
x there is little evidence that large numbers want to stop being self-employed; less than a fifth 
planned to leave in the next three years and, of these, for over half they wished to simply 
retire;   
x most of the self-HPSOR\HGIHHOWKHLUOLYHVDUHµEHWWHURII¶RYHUDOOFRPSDUHGWREHLQJDQ
employee, and half believe they are better off financially (although evidence shows earnings 
are significantly lower relative to larger businesses). 
Overall, therefore, it seems that self-HPSOR\PHQWLVYLHZHGDVDµSRVLWLYHFKRLFH¶E\PRVWGHVSLWH
relatively low incomes; people appear to value independence and flexibility over financial returns.   
4. Possible drivers for self-employment 
There are a variety of reasons for and drivers of the growth in self-employment14:   
The economic cycle - difficulties in finding a job has pushed some unemployed workers to 
become self-employed, and low wage growth has led to some people choosing self-employment 
as a way to supplement household income.  
Less stable working arrangements for employees - following the financial crash, many 
businesses have been forced to make organisational changes and cut-backs through 
redundancies, freezing pay and offering less financial rewards to employees. This, combined 
with the increase in other workplace practices such as zero hours contracts, have likely led some 
to view working for an employer as less stable or advantageous. In such circumstances, self-
employment becomes more attractive.  
Demographics ± in many developed economies the population is ageing, and older workers are 
more likely to be self-employed than younger ones (perhaps as they have more knowledge, 
funding or experience to start businesses15). Wealth losses following the financial crisis (for 
example, lower pension values) may have led to some older self-employed workers to choose to 
work longer, and older employees postponing retirement from the labour market and becoming 
self-employed in order to boost their retirement income. Some older employees are also 
                                                          
13
 Source: Small Business Survey, UK Government 
14
 See for example Self-employment: what can we learn from recent developments? Bank of England (2015); The self-
employment boom: Key issues for the 2015 Parliament;  UK Parliament 2015 , Trends in Self Employment in the UK: 2001-2015 
ONS (2016) 
15
 See for example Going solo Does self-employment offer a solution to youth unemployment?, The Work Foundation  
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choosing to continue work through self-employment beyond retirement due to better health 
and/or a simple wish to work.   
Flexibility, particularly for female workers ± the choice of self-employment to seek more 
flexibility is a key driver in the rise of self employment. Women tend to take on the majority of 
family caring responsibilities, and self employment offers the opportunity to work around these 
obligations. Self-employment also allows highly trained female workers to retain their skills 
without dropping out of the labour market completely, until such times as they are able to re-enter 
should they wish to do so. 
Autonomy ± increasingly, workers are not solely driven by financial incentives, and other factors 
such as independence and autonomy are becoming more important.  In essence, more poeple 
wanWWRµEHWKHLURZQERVV¶ 
Changing business models ± some companies have been seeking to reduce their labour costs 
by using consultants and contractors to deliver services (outsourcing) rather than employing 
people directly. This has increased the market opportunities for self employment.  
Technology ± in recent years it has become easier and less costly to start a business. The costs 
of IT equipment have fallen substantially, while the use of the internet and social media has 
expanded, making it easier and less costly for self-employed businesses to advertise and 
PDUNHW1HZRQOLQHµDSSV¶VXFKDV8EHUDQG'HOLYHURRPDNHLWHDVLHUWRDFFHVVFXVWRPHUV
Also, the growing use of online procurement marketplaces by companies allows self-employed 
people to more easily bid for contracts. 
The significant rise in self-employment in Scotland is likely due to a combination of the factors 
above, although there is no specific research available that has considered in detail which may 
be the most important. However, as is discussed in the next section, most of the growth of self-
employment in Scotland is by females, and by males and females aged over 65. This suggests 
that demographics, a desire for greater flexibility, and becoming self-employment to boost 
household income may be the key drivers.  
5. Characteristics of self-employment in Scotland: gender, place and sectors 
Key characteristics of self employment in Scotland include: 
x Women have accounted for 70% of the growth in the number of self-employed (+29,400) 
in Scotland since 2006, although they still only account for around one third of all self-
employed 
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x People aged 65+ accounted for 20% of the increase (+16,300), although still account for 
just 10% of all self-employed.  
x Rural areas tend to have higher self-employment rates, for example around 20% of 
people in employment in Scottish Borders and Dumfries & Galloway are self-employed 
compared to 12% for Scotland as a whole. This is likely due to a high level of self-
employment in agriculture.  
Potential reasons for the significant growth in female self-employment include: 
x Increasing overall female participation rates16 
x (as discussed in the previous section) self-employment allows women greater flexibility 
(e.g. to work around care responsibilities) and an opportunity to increase household 
incomes  
x the growth in opportunities in parts of the service sector that are more suited to flexible 
working (e.g. childminding and personal services)17.  
 
 
Source: Annual Population Survey 
The two largest sectors for self-HPSOR\PHQWDUHµ3URIHVVLRQDOEXVLQHVV	WHFKQLFDO¶ZKLFK
include business and management consultants) and Construction. Since 2010, the fastest 
                                                          
16
 Over the same period male rates have decreased 
17
 The top three occupations for self-employed women are cleaners, childminders and hairdressers/barbers 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20160105160709/http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171776_374941.pdf  
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growing sectors for self-employment have been Professional business & technical (+13,420); 
Other services (+7,030); and, Information/communication activities (+5,910).  
Figure 6: Self-employed businesses in Scotland, by sector, 2016 (%) 
 
Source: Scottish Government 
7KHJURZWKLQWKHµ3URIHVVLRQDOEXVLQHVV	WHFKQLFDO¶DQGµ,QIRUPDWLRQFRPPXQLFDWLRQV¶VHFWRUV
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treatment, fitness & wellbeing and repair services, is likely to be driven by low cost of setting up 
businesses (for example in terms of required equipment), and that the types of activities are 
VXLWDEOHIRUIOH[LEOHZRUNLQJ,WLVDOVRZRUWKQRWLQJWKHHPHUJHQFHRIµQHZ¶VHFWRUVand jobs, for 
examples digital marketing specialists and data managers, which, because they can be 
undertaken from home, may be accessible to self-employed people. 
6. Impact of the growth in self-employment on Scottish productivity 
On average, self-employed businesses have significantly lower levels of productivity than 
businesses with employees (as measured by turnover per employee), and this is true for all 
sectors, bar wholesale. Self-employment productivity varies significantly from a high of £148,000 
per employee in wholesale to a low of £22,500 in education.  
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Figure 8: Turnover per employee (£), by business size, Scotland 2016 
 
Source: Scottish Government 
 
Low productivity may reflect that the self-employed do not benefit ± generally - IURPµHFRQRPLHV
RIVFDOH¶DVGRODUJHUEXVLQHVVHV$OVRVHOI-employed people may generate less output if a 
VLJQLILFDQWDPRXQWRIWLPHLVVSHQWµSLWFKLQJ¶IRUZRUN 
In addition, evidence shows that self-employed businesses perform slightly less well on the key 
drivers of productivity, such as innovation, internationalisation and significantly worse in terms of 
capital investment, as compared to businesses with employees. 
Figure 9: Scottish self-employed business performance, by drivers of productivity (2015) 
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Scotland18. Research suggests that hourly earnings of almost half of self-employed people are 
below the level of the National Living Wage19 (which does not cover the self-employed). 
At the UK level, median annual earnings (in real terms) from self-employment have declined by 
16% since 2007/08, much faster than for employees (-10%)20. The reasons for this are unclear, 
but it could be due to the growth. 
6. Conclusions and implications for Scotland 
Self-employment has been growing strongly in recent years, accounting for almost half of 
6FRWODQG¶VRYHUDOOHPSOR\PHQWJURZWKVLQFHDQGIRUPRVWRIWKHLQFUHDVHLQWKHQXPEHURI
businesses. The self-employed, however, still constitute a low proportion of overall total 
employment in Scotland.  
There are a range of drivers for this increase in self-employment, including the economic 
environment, demographics, technology and changing business models of employers. 
The average productivity level of self-employed businesses is significantly lower than larger 
RQHVOLNHO\GXHWRDODFNRIµHFRQRPLHVRIVFDOH¶DQGGXHWRZHDNHUSHUIRUPDQFHRQDQXPEHURI
drivers of productivity such as innovation, internationalisation and especially investment. It is not 
possible to assess whether there are productivity benefits to businesses that use self-employed 
workers (e.g. through contractors), and this could be an area for future research.  
Lower earnings amongst the self-employed are likely to reflect lower productivity as well as the 
strong growth in part-time self-employment. Notwithstanding this, most self-employed people are 
content with their working status, including their financial status and reward.  
,WLVOLNHO\WKDWWKHUHODWLYHO\VORZJURZWKLQ6FRWODQG¶VSURductivity in recent years is in (small) part 
due to the increase in self-employment.  It is not possible, however, due to data availability to 
estimate the specific contribution of self-employment growth to weak productivity growth as 
compared to other factors such as innovation, investment, internationalisation and management 
practices21.   
A key challenge is whether the productivity levels, and therefore the earnings, of self-employed 
people can be increased. Potential ways include raising the awareness of the benefits of:  
                                                          
18
 Family Resources Survey (DWP) Scottish data not available. 
19
 Tough gig: Low paid self-employment in London and the UK, Social Market Foundation (2016)  
20
 The income of the self-employed, Department of Business, Innovation and Skills (2016) 
21
 2WKHUUHDVRQVIRU6FRWODQG¶VUHODWLYHO\ORZSURGXFWLYLW\JURZWKDUHGLVFXVVHGLQWKH6FRWWLVK(QWHUSULVHSDSHUµScotland's 
productivity performance: latest data and LQVLJKWV¶ 
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x investing in developing the skills needed to run and grow a successful self-employed 
business (including how to market and bid for contracts) 
x using the right technology, for example to market services, sell online, bid for contracts etc. 
x collaborative working with others as part of a consortium (for example, to bid for larger 
contracts and achieve economies of scale)22. 
For businesses that use the self-employed as contractors or consultants, DGRSWLQJµIDLUZRUN¶
practices (e.g. not using exploitative zero hours contracts and offering a safe and supporting 
working environment etc.) can provide productivity gains for both the business and the 
contractor, for example in terms of greater engagement and motivation to provide value-added 
services. 
Also, raising the ambition of more self-employed people to grow their businesses and become 
HPSOR\HUVLVDIXUWKHUSRWHQWLDOZD\WRKHOSERRVW6FRWODQG¶VSURGXFWLYLW\ 
However, a significant number of people choose self-employment for lifestyle reasons (e.g. to 
maintain or increase income or as a job after retirement from full time employment).  In these 
circumstance, they may not have the motivation, ambition or incentive to significantly invest in 
productivity-enhancing activities or to grow their business and become employers. 
To develop further our understanding of the current and future implications of the growth in self-
employment, there are a number of areas for potential research. These include: 
x developing a better understanding of the potential to increase the productivity of self-
employed workers in different sectors, and the policies and levers required to achieve 
this; 
x ZKHWKHUDQGKRZWKHDPELWLRQVDQGVNLOOVRIµOLIHVW\OHVHOI-HPSOR\HG¶FDQEHUDLVHGWR
encourage productivity growth; 
x the scale, nature and implications of future self-employment growth, taking into account 
trends such changing demography (aging population), technology developments 
(including the further roll-out of broadband), and increased automation (and the 
opportunities this may provide); and 
x the degree to which the prevalence of business models that drive self-employment (such 
as Uber) will increase and become more common in different sectors, and their 
productivity implications. 
                                                          
22
 See for example Co-operative Development Scotland 
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